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Article Abstract
The recent US liquidity crisis, triggered by the failure of mortgage-related securities, produced
long-lasting ramifications inside and outside of the US. International financial indicators and the housing
markets demonstrate that the mortgage-related liquidity problems keep reverberating throughout the US
and the global economy. In the US, even such giants as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae, which were
expected to inject market liquidity, have declared considerable losses from subprime MBS. The ongoing
crisis provided a fertile ground for a number of publications and research. However, a range of
fundamental issues regarding legislative responses to the US MBS crisis and its international corollaries
remain ambiguous. This research aspires to shed light on the momentous lessons of the crisis in a way
assisting foreign lawmakers who seek to commence securitization in their jurisdictions.
First, the paper is premised on the argument that securitization is a profitable evolving
phenomenon despite the present crisis and criticism in the scholarship of recent years. Secondly, the
author discusses the consequences and possible methods of increasing the incentives of the parties, such
as, inter alia, lenders and rating agencies, to ensure more responsible pricing of the underlying
mortgages and collateralized securities. It is furthermore important to scrutinize the agenda of the US
regulators and financial industries as their approaches are oftentimes transplanted abroad in some way.
The third point in question is the impact of the US, as a model securitization jurisdiction, on other
countries. The specific focus of this analysis is the example of transplanting the US model to the Russian
Federation.

Table of Contents
TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS.................................................................................................................................3
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................................................4
1. THEORIES OF SECURITIZATION ....................................................................................................................6
2. SOCIAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE MBS CRISIS ........................................................................................11
Subprime and Predatory Lending: The State, The Federal and The Market .....................................................11
Legislative Dangers: Overregulation v. Underregulation .................................................................................16
3. MARKET INEFFICIENCIES: MORAL HAZARD, LACK OF DISCLOSURE AND RISK ASSESSMENT
.....................................................................................................................................................................................18
Rating Agencies as the Primary Market Gatekeepers........................................................................................18
Other Supposed Gatekeepers and Lines of Defense...........................................................................................21
Regulatory Responses ........................................................................................................................................22
Consumer Protection and the Need for Regulatory Cooperation ......................................................................29
Conclusions........................................................................................................................................................34
4. HISTORY LESSONS AND MARKET PERIODIZATION OF THE US MORTGAGE-BACKED
SECURITIZATION ..................................................................................................................................................35
5. THE RUSSIAN AND US MORTGAGE FINANCING MODELS ...................................................................48
Mortgage Financing In Russia: Adaptation of the US Securitization Model.....................................................49
The Future of the Russian Securitization: Lessons from the US ........................................................................60
CONCLUSIONS........................................................................................................................................................61

2

Table of Abbreviations
ABS
AHML
Art.
CMBS
CMM
DOS
FHA
FSA
GSE
LTV
MBS
NBA
OCC
OTS
PMBS
PTI
REIT
RESPA
RMBS
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Asset-Backed Securities
Agency for Housing Mortgage Lending (also “the Agency”)
Article of a statute or a Code
Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities
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Financial Services Authority
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Real Estate Investment Trust
Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
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Introduction
National financial markets nowadays evolve into a global phenomenon. Not surprisingly,
the present US liquidity crisis triggered by the meltdown of mortgage-related securities markets
produced long-lasting international ramifications.1 In the US, the mortgage markets remain
unstable with home sales and prices hitting record low2 and an incessant growth of foreclosures.3
Most US banks, investment banks and other financial institutions sustained considerable losses,
some failed,4 and almost all of them have written down substantial portions of their mortgagerelated security portfolios. Even gigantic Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac suffered considerable
losses from subprime MBS.5
The ongoing crisis provided fertile ground for a number of policy statements, legislative
proposals, and theoretical publications. Similarly to the post-Enron public mood, the term
“securitization” has become associated with financial instruments of dubious quality.6 However,
originally, mortgage-backed securitization was perceived as the engine behind the American

1

Laurence Norman, Money-Market Rates Show Tumult Hasn't Subsided Yet, WSJ (October 4, 2007), at C3.; Nina
Koeppen, ECB Says It Stands Ready To Inject Additional Liquidity, WSJ (March 27, 2008); Alistair MacDonald
Northern Rock U.K. Regulator Admits Errors In Supervision of Northern Rock, WSJ (March 27, 2008), Page C2;
Margot Patrick, Northern Rock Shares Secured; Assessment for Holders Pending, WSJ (February 23, 2008), A2.
2
See, e.g., Jeff Bater, Gloom Persists as Demand Drops for Durable Goods, New-Home Sales Fall, WSJ (March 27,
2008), A2.
3
See, e.g., The Hammer Drops: America's Houses are Being Repossessed at a Record Rate. What comes next? THE
ECONOMIST (October 4th, 2007); Mike Barris, Property Report: January Foreclosure Filings Rose 57% From 2007,
WSJ (February 26, 2008).
4
“Bear […] was brought to its knees by poor mortgage-bond trades in its own hedge funds and by the growing
credit crunch, which began with the mortgage turmoil.” Gregory Zuckerman, Hedge Funds, Once a Windfall,
Contribute to Bear's Downfall, WSJ (March 17, 2008), C1.
5
“Fannie puts its overall exposure to subprime mortgages at $54.1 billion and its exposure to Alt-A loans […] at
$350.6 billion. […] Fannie already has had to write down the value of those securities, and some analysts say bigger
write-downs may be needed.” James R. Hagerty, Fannie, Freddie Shares Suffer Hit As Mortgage-Default Fears
Mount, WSJ (March 11, 2008), A3.
6
SPVs, off-balance sheet financing and the general lack of transparency in securitized transactions have been
partially blamed for the Enron and other corporate scandals. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Securitization PostEnron, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1539 (2004)
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dream of home ownership in the era of high mortgage-interest rates in the 1960-1970s7 and today
still remains a viable mechanism of mortgage financing.
This research targets several interconnected dilemmas. Fist, I emphasize that there are no
theories fully explaining structured finance, pricing of securitization products and risk-allocation
among various parties. Hence, the present crisis is not explained and could not be anticipated in
advance at the theoretical level, nor were there any historical data on the behavior of everevolving structured instruments. Secondly, the paper scrutinizes the current mortgage crisis from
the two perspectives. On the one hand, I consider the social consequences of the problem and the
predatory lending, as a by-product of the subprime market. On the other hand, the analysis
proceeds to the financial markets and the regulatory responses to the crisis. The issues raised in
the paper cover the “moral hazards” associated with MBS and mispricing of financial products.
An important element of the discussion is the methods as to how to increase the incentives of the
parties, such as, inter alia, lenders and rating agencies, to ensure responsible pricing of
underlying mortgages and collateralized securities.
The third issue is the impact of the US, as a model securitization jurisdiction, on other
countries. The author analyzes the main periods in the history of securitization and compares
them with some aspects of the Russian market. Particularly, the discussion is centered on the
Russian housing agency as compared with the US GSEs. Finally, this paper argues that it would
be too early to discard MBS as a profitable and socially useful financial instrument in the US and
elsewhere. Instead of rejecting the US models, transplanting jurisdictions should merely make
appropriate corrections in national law and regulatory practices preventing a similar credit
7

See, e.g., SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET AND MORTGAGE CREDIT HEARINGS (S. 2958, S. 3503, S. 3508, and
S.3442) United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Banking and Currency. Subcommittee on Housing and
Urban Affairs, 91st Cong. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off. (1970), at 1 and 36, on the expansion of purchasing
powers of FNMA and the creation of FHLMC.

5

crunch from happening. In this sense, the US regulatory and market solutions remain an
invaluable information source for other jurisdictions.
1. Theories of Securitization
The present crisis emphasized such fundamental issues as whether structured finance
remains a vital mode of mortgage financing. No fundamental theory on the issue has been
developed to date. Let us consider the pros and cons of securitization in a double paradigm of the
costs and benefits for the originator and for the general public. Some argue that securitization
benefits all parties through lower costs of financing.8 The three pillars of the “cost” theory are
the “monitoring costs,” the bankruptcy costs of securitization9 and the greater liquidity achieved
through conversion of illiquid mortgages or other assets to securities traded on the securities
markets.10 The fourth element is transferring illiquid mortgages from balance sheets of banks and
thrifts, thus, assuring a better match of the maturity of their assets and liabilities and providing
for more capital available for future lending. In the 1980s-1990s, much ink was spilled
acclaiming the benefits of lower costs and greater liquidity associated with MBS and discussing
the potential for cutting off the GSE’s links with the government in favor of greater reliance on
the then vibrant private MBS market.11
In theory, securitization reduces the costs of monitoring the following elements: the
quality of collateral - assayed by the rating agencies12 - and, in case of commercial mortgage-

8

See, e.g., one of Prof. Schwarcz’s early articles on ABS “The Alchemy of Asset Securitization” (Steven L.
Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994)).
9
See also the discussions on the asset partitioning and its effect on organizational and property law, e.g., Hansmann,
Henry,and Reinier Kraakman. The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 390, 420-421 (2002).
10
See, e.g., Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Coletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and New
Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1372 (1991); Faten Sabry and Thomas Schopflocher, The Subprime Meltdown:
Who, What, Where and Why...Investigations & Litigation, 1633 PLI/CORP 89 (2007).
11
Panos Konstas, Privatizing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: An Operating Restriction May be Enough to Increase
Competition and Efficiency, 114 BANKING L.J. 943 (1997).
12
On the role of “gatekeepers” in securitization, see the discussion infra at 18.
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backed and asset-backed securities, lesser costs of monitoring of debtor’s affairs in bankruptcy
due to the use of SPVs. In sum, securitization is perceived as a more evolved form of secured
financing. Some authors call into question whether bankruptcy and bankruptcy-remoteness
matter.13 Both are only hypothetical risks loaded with risk-assessment uncertainties and
arbitrariness. Other scholars continuously argue that the equitable concepts of “true sale” and
“substantive consolidation” are important in the contexts of properly structured securitization
transactions14 and potential bankruptcy reforms.15 In asset-backed securitization, bankruptcy
remoteness is statistically significant; and after the LTV case16 the comparative spreads for
debtors eligible to file under Chapter 11 increased as opposed to those who are not eligible under
Chapter 11,17 including banks.
For individual mortgagors and mortgage lenders, bankruptcy reforms may be of lesser
importance compared to the contract law, including, e.g., DOS clauses and disclosure rules, and
the mechanisms of home foreclosures, which are within the purview of either federal or state
law. Here, the issue of federal preemption of state law and regulations as applied to national
banks and S&Ls becomes the most important. For the purposes of securitization, standardization
of mortgage instruments and unification of regulatory requirements have long been the top

13

Carlson, for instance, argues that “[o]ne is skeptical that mere hypothetical risks should be worth so much in the
market. Nevertheless, securitization theorists have assumed that the cost of funds depends on the purely hypothetical
question of bankruptcy jurisdiction.” David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundations of Securitization, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1055 (1998), at 1057.
14
“[W]hile there should be no issue with challenging poorly-structured or fraudulent transactions, securitization
transactions in general should not be viewed as “guilty” until proven “innocent”; rather, the contrary should be the
case -- properly structured transactions that are within the acceptable practice of structured finance should enjoy
legitimacy -- as securitization is a highly successful capital markets mechanism with a proven track record in the
residential mortgage financing area.” Shmuel Vasser, The “Evil” Securitization and the American Dream, 13 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1 ART. 2 (2004).
15
Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and Bankuptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant? 11 J. BANKR. L. &
PRAC. 101 (2002).
16
LTV Steel Company, Inc., In re, 274 B.R. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, 2001).
17
Kenneth M. Ayotte and Stav Gaon, Asset-Backed Securities: Costs and Benefits of: “Bankruptcy Remoteness”
(Apr. 2, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Fordham Law Review).
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priority issues, while concerns about the quality of the mortgages and consumer protection were
among secondary issues.
Several years ago, mortgages were considered as the assets of the highest quality for the
purposes of assessing the risk-weighted bank assets in the US and under Basel I.18 Times,
evidently, changed due to the omnipresent use of irresponsible mortgage underwriting standards
and the resulting mass foreclosures. The costs of foreclosures are soaring. In some regions,
whole neighborhoods are affected by the crisis, what further drives down the real estate prices in
general and the price recovered through foreclosure sales in particular.19 In fact, the low-quality
loans and securities hit lenders with not lesser severity than borrowers, as the recent demise of
Bear Stearns illustrates. No abstract theory has yet parsed and comprehensively analyzed the
correlations between the quality of individual mortgage loans and the ultimate profits and losses
of the investors.
The theories on securitization in corporate settings presume that it exists due to
informational asymmetries and the hidden action problem between insiders and outsiders about
pricing of assets of a company. By analogy, in the mortgage markets, “insiders” were mortgage
originators, including mortgage brokers and banks, which promptly relocated the risks to
investors. Iacobucci and Winter also point out at a number of what they deem as common
fallacies20 axiomatically presumed about ABS. One is that a low-quality firm can offer highquality securities. Today, it appears that that was not a fallacy in case of the subprime markets,

18

See, e.g., Damian Paletta and Alistair MacDonald, Mortgage Fallout exposes Holes in New Bank-Risk Rules:
Looser Guidelines Fact a Backlash As Losses Pile Up, WSJ (March 4, 2008), at 2. See also, e.g., JONATHAN R.
MACEY, GEOFFREY P. MILLER AND RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION, 3rd edition, Aspen
Publishers (2001), at 283.
19
See, e.g., Jeff D. Ordyke, Gauging Value In Real Estate As Prices Slide, WSJ March 13, 2008; Page D1.
20
Edward Iacobucci, Ralph A. Winter, Asset Securitization and Asymmetric Information, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 161
(2005).
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where borrowers, whose mortgages backed triple-A MBS, had low credit scores and the
properties were not adequately assessed.
The same scholars,21 similar to other researchers,22 discern a number of common
advantages of securitization, including, e.g., reduced agency costs, superior signaling to the
market that the assets are of appropriate quality and supplying better information to investors. In
such a case, originators should have had the objective incentives to match the value of securities
sold through an SPE to the value of collateral. Thereby, securitized products supposedly
represent a better valuation of underlying assets. Again, as the present day market evinces, this
hypothesis has not withstood practical tests in the long run.
The rating agencies failed to raise a red flag with regard to loans with high PTI and other
questionable ratios signaling that the loans were originated to borrowers, who were unable to
repay the loans, and were premised on the price of real estate collateral. At the same time,
mortgage brokers and subprime lenders in general seemed to be unwilling to verify collateral
assessments or creditworthiness of mortgagors23 or to share the information with the market. One
of the potential causes of the information asymmetry was misaligned incentives of market
agents.
It appears almost indisputable that, ab origine, liquidity, monitoring and better pricing
were the major traits of securitization. The question is why they did not work in the subprime
markets. The answer lies in resolving the incongruity between the incentives of market
participants and the provision of adequate pricing by virtue of upgrading obsolete disclosure

21

Id.
See, e.g., Joseph C. Shenker and Anthony J. Colletta, supra note 10, at 1370-1381.
23
See, e.g., Deborah Goldstein, Understanding Predatory Lending: Moving Towards a Common Definition and
Workable Solutions, JOINT CTR. FOR HOUSING STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIV.(1999), at 8. Available at <http://
www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/finance/goldstein_w99-11.pdf>.

22
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mechanisms. The policy and statutory response to these problems is important not only for the
US market and the impending overhaul of the regulatory regime, but for many other countries
whether developed or developing. The problems of the US markets are affecting many
economies around the globe. The recent nationalization of the Northern Rock Bank in the UK24
is one of the examples of the global shock wave, even though several months ago Europe seemed
to exhibit “a lot of resilience to the crisis.”25
A theoretical analysis of the causes of the crisis is of consequence for not only the US or
other developed market economies, but even more so for those countries, which attempt to
transplant the American model of MBS. Developing economies face many phenomena that the
US and Western Europe had to go through decades ago. Russia is an example. The absence of
formerly state-provided public housing, high mortgage rates, inflation and growing real estate
prices are all characteristic to Russia today26 and to the US in the late 1960s-early 1970s.27 Even
though the fundamental underlying sources of this resemblance may be disparate,28 similar
policy and legislative approaches may, possibly, be applicable to both situations taking into
account the general trends of convergence in global finances.
The absence of a comprehensive theory on MBS and structured finance complicates the
resolution of the crisis in the US and clouds the policy alternatives for transplanting jurisdictions.
24

Supra note 1.
"Europe, Middle East and Africa are showing a lot of resilience to the crisis and the region is a central part of our
strategy," UBS's Mr. Prelle said. "Russia continues to grow, while there is a growing pool of liquidity in the Middle
East. We expect a restructuring of the financial-services sector and that will provide growth," he added. U.S.
Investment Banks Cast Their Eyes Abroad Fees in Europe Surge As Performance Lags, WSJ (October 4, 2007). See
also Joellen Perry, EU Expects Slowdown to Be Mild, WSJ (March 27, 2008) Page A2.
26
Greg Walters and Alex Nicholson, Medvedev Says Inflation Is Price of Being World Power, Bloomberg (March
25. 2008). Available at
<http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aWcDP5OySNOE&refer=home>.
See also Analytical Review: Mortgage Financing and Securitization [“Ipotechnoe kreditovanie I Sekiyuritizatsia”],
RUSIPOTEKA (January, 2008). Available at <http://www.rusipoteka.ru/review/0108-review.pdf>.
27
See the discussion infra at 34-44.
28
For instance, Russia profits on the oil exports while the US suffered from the Oil Crisis; Russia does not have
such a well-developed bank system as the US had had for decades; etc.

25
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It will take time before economists come up with plausible general theories. The following
sections do not attempt to provide economic theories or solutions. Instead, the author tackles
various social and legal problems associated with the mortgage meltdown, the subprime and
predatory lending and analyzes the existing legislative proposals in light of the historical goals of
MBS, i.e., better liquidity and cheaper mortgage capital.

2. Social Ramifications of the MBS Crisis
Subprime and Predatory Lending: The State, The Federal and The Market
It is already common knowledge that the risks of subprime mortgage collateralized
securities were significantly underpriced. Among the reasons are predatory and negligent
subprime lending, leading to misevaluation of real estate collateral. Unfortunately, no long-term
performance records related to subprime MBS were available as the products were substantially
new. Mortgage subprime and predatory lending are themselves relatively new phenomena. Some
believe that predatory and totally legal subprime lending practices were based on the “increases
in capital made possible by securitization, increase in risk-based pricing facilitated by
technological advances, and the deregulation of the banking industry.”29
Prior to the upsurge in derivatives and other complex financial innovations, the old
disclosure measures, such as the Truth in Lending Act30 (hereinafter “TILA”), worked well.
Notably, when TILA was enacted, one of its justifications was the increasing speed of market
innovations and the new types of “‘financing,’ featuring seller buydowns, adjustable rate

29

Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis. 124 BANKING L.J. 407,
410(2007). See, e.g., her analysis of Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act; Tax Reform
Act of 1986; the Financial Institutions Reform Act; the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,.
30
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) (Pub.L. 90-321, Title I, May 29, 1968, 82 Stat. 146), codified in various sections
under Title 15, Chapter 41 (15 U.S.C. § 1601-1667). etc.
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mortgages, and balloon payments.”31 With FNMA and FHLMC reforms, more types of
mortgages, such as ARMs, graduate-payment mortgages and others,32 expanded the array of loan
products as opposed to the fully amortized long-term fixed-rate mortgage that banks the thrifts
had traditionally offered.
Hence, with those developments, the Congress passed TILA providing for more
informational protection to mortgagors. The Act is basically a part of the Consumer Credit
Protection Act targeting a particular stratum of consumers, viz., home loan borrowers. Among
other things, the Act also governed advertising by lenders. These information and “educational”
measures should be of particular interest for such countries like Russia, where the new federal
statute “On Advertising” has only sketchily delineated what information may be generally
included in advertising of financial services. No specific information on the particulars of loan
origination or any accompanying legend is required from a lender.33
TILA was, apparently, a necessary statutory disclosure mechanism. However, as the
market has evolved with time, it became only somewhat helpful as a prevention device.
Currently, the Federal Reserve conducts a review of TILA with respect to more disclosure

31

Dee Pridgen and Richard M. Alderman, Part C. Truth in Lending Disclosures, Real Estate, CONCRED §
9:1(2006).
32
For an overview of the types of MBS and mortgages, see, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI, THE HANDBOOK OF
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill (2001), 3-75.
33
See the Federal Statute “On Advertisements” [“O reklame”] of 03.13.2006 No. 38-ФЗ (the latest amendments are
of 07.21.2007 No. 193-ФЗ). Under art. 28 of the statute, an advertisement of banking, insurance or other financial
services should contain the name of a person or an organization providing such services. “If an advertisement of
services associated with granting a loan, using it or discharging it contains at least one clause having an impact on
the costs of the loan, then such advertisement should include all other terms, determining the actual costs of the loan
for a borrower and affecting those.” [“Если реклама услуг, связанных с предоставлением кредита,
пользованием им и погашением кредита, содержит хотя бы одно условие, влияющее на его стоимость,
такая реклама должна содержать все остальные условия, определяющие фактическую стоимость
кредита для заемщика и влияющие на нее.”]
The language of the statute is extremely vague to say the least. How it may be possible to include “all other terms”
that may have an impact on loan costs in an advertisement, for instance, a one-minute TV ad, is an interesting
puzzle.
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requirements, misleading advertisements and other provisions.34 In fact, in order to keep pace
with the inventions of new market instruments, the regulators should adopt a practice of
recurrently reviewing disclosure requirements protecting individual mortgagors under TILA or
other statutes that may be enacted in the future. Consumer protection is one of the areas where
public authorities cannot afford to act retrospectively, as they often do in response to a crisis.
Predatory mortgage financing has been flourishing for years despite numerous consumer
protection, usury, and anti-predatory lending statutes.35 The scope of the subprime and predatory
lending problem was acknowledged only lately as it was spilling over from targeted customer
groups36 to the practices of general avoidance of consumer protection laws.37 The variety of
predatory lending practices is hardly identifiable. Generally, it includes loan flipping, originating
mortgage loans based on the LTV ratio without taking into consideration the PTI and the ability
to repay a debt obligation in general, high prepayment penalties, etc.38 The term “predatory

34

Policy Statement on Financial Market Developments, The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets
(March 2008), at 12.
Available at <http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/pwgpolicystatemktturmoil_03122008.pdf>.
35
Often, standardization of mortgage terms and federal preemption of state usury, disclosure and other mortgagerelated laws are sometimes perceived as elements of modern development of finance, where law plays a much lesser
role in mortgage origination. See Ann M. Burkhart, Real Estate Practice in the Twenty-First Century, 72 MO. L.
REV. 1031, 1037-1039 and 1046-1047 (2007). On the practices of trapping borrowers to remain with inequitable
loans, see, e.g., Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due
Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 518 (2002).
36
See, e.g., Regina Austin, Of Predatory Lending and the Democratization of Credit: Preserving the Social Safety
Net in Small Loan Transactions, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1217 (2004); Cecil J. Hunt, II, In the Racial Crosshairs:
Reconsidering Racially Targeted Predatory Lending Under a New Theory of Economic Hate Crime, 35 U. TOL. L.
REV. 211, 313 (2003); Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can
Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 693 (2003).
37
Those were state usury laws and federal statutes, such as the Home Ownership Equity Preservation Act (Pub.L.
103-325 (1994)), amending the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”), and others. For a discussion on TILA, HOEPA and
other consumer-protection statutes see, e.g., Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L.
REV. 2185, 2226-2229 (2007). The author argued that “most federal statutes have narrow technical causes of action
and/or relatively insignificant remedies.” Id, 2237.
38
Eric C. Bartley, And Federal Regulation for All: Federally Regulating the Mortgage Banking Industry, MICH. ST.
L. REV 477, 481-484(2006).
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lending” per se is context-based and lacking a precise and uniform definition,39 which is partially
due to the constant evolution of the phenomenon in theory and practice.40 Among its features are
rent seeking, the lack of transparency and proper reporting, waivers of legal redress and
generally unfavorable covenants depriving mortgagors of the remedies that would normally be
available under the common or statutory law.41 The system demonstrated either the negligent
indifference to the potential harm inflicted by borrowers and loan purchasers or the fraudulent
intent to trigger further foreclosures and rip off the equity accumulated by the borrowers.
Even being enhanced by regulations and other statutes, such as, e.g., the Real Estate

39

See Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Working Paper, Economic Issues in
Predatory Lending 6 (July 30, 2003). The report mentions that given the current disagreement as to the nature and
essence of predatory lending and “without a precise definition, many of the published figures on predatory lending
abuses become less convincing.” Available at <http://www.occ.treas.gov/workingpaper.pdf>.
40
For instance, Azmy’s analysis of literature summarized the following core features generally attributed to
predatory lending: (i) credit is provided when it is not needed or on terms not justified by a borrower's credit risk or
in order to exact rents; (ii) there is a subjective intent of a broker or lender to mislead, deceive, or exploit a
financially unsophisticated borrower; and (iii) the terms of the credit or practices of the lender put a borrower at
unreasonable risk of default or foreclosure.” Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States
as Laboratories of Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REV. 295, 320 (2005).
California Association of Mortgage Brokers was among the first professional organizations in that industry
expressinv prodigious concern about the proliferation of abusive lending practices. Predatory lending is defined as
“intentionally placing consumers in mortgage loans with significantly worse terms and higher costs than loans
offered to similarly qualified consumers, by the majority of mortgage brokers or lenders in the region, for the
primary purpose of enriching the loan originator and with little or no regard to the costs to the consumer.”
The Association also proclaims predatory lending “unethical” and often in violation of law and provides the
following examples of such practices:
“Fraud: Forged loan documents, falsified tax returns or other documents, overstating income or assets to qualify
borrowers for loans they cannot afford, inflated appraisals.
Discrimination: Charging higher rates and fees, with less favorable terms, to borrowers based on their race, national
origin, age, marital status or neighborhood, than would be charged according to traditional factors such as
employment history, credit record, and sufficient income to make required mortgage payments.
Misrepresentation: The costs or loan terms at closing are not as advertised, or as presented at the time of application,
and which are not properly disclosed prior to closing as mandated by law.
Bait and Switch: Qualified borrowers are steered away from affordable options for the express purpose of increasing
fee income to the unethical loan originator.
Non-Disclosure: Key costs, fees, and terms are not disclosed, or inaccurately or only partially disclosed in violation
of law and State and Federal lending regulations.”
Available at <http://www.cambweb.org/main/page/BestPractices>.
41
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory
Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260-1261 (2002).
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Settlement Procedures Act (hereinafter “RESPA”),42 TILA, obviously, had limited efficiency in
furthering disclosures preventing predatory lending. Therefore, state law initiatives are often
more unswerving proscribing certain high-cost loans. The statutory movement was launched in
the late 1990s by North Carolina,43 whose 1999 mortgage statute addressed high interest rate
loans and was applied to all possible types of lenders. Due to the regional concerns about the
competition among local and national banks, of the two dozens of states that followed NC’s suit,
many linked their legislation to the federal standards.44
Some novel departures and variations of federal standards may be found in, for example,
the New York (NY) Banking Law, that establishes thresholds for determining whether a loan is
high-cost and, thus, encumbered by certain restrictions.45 Those include, inter alia, prohibitions
on negative amortization, balloon payments, modification or deferral fees, “loan flipping,” “no
lending without due regard to the repayment ability,” various kickbacks to mortgage brokers, and
others. A set of special notices to the borrowers and a legend indicating that the loan is high-cost
should also be provided. The civil liability of lenders, brokers or “any person found by a
preponderance of the evidence” to have violated the law is far-reaching and the remedies under
the statute are not exclusive.46 Compared to the discussed below Georgia Statute of 2003,47 the
NY Statute is more specific and, most importantly, is more welcome in light of the current
42

Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 (RESPA) (Pub.L. 93-533, Dec. 22, 1974, 88 Stat. 1724). Codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617. See also, e.g., George J. Wallace, Explicit Pricing,' Fraud and Consumer Information:
The Reform of RESPA, 12 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 183 (1981) (the author also analyzes contract adjacent to primary
mortgage loan agreements, such as, for instance, insurance contracts).
43
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 24-1.1E, 24-10.2. The statute governed a broad range of market participants including all
lenders acting within the state jurisdiction, such as banks, thrifts, credit unions, all mortgage brokers, mortgage
bankers, and finance companies, etc.
44
The federal standards are quite comprehensive, albeit general. For instance, "[a] creditor shall not engage in
extending credit to consumers based on the consumers' collateral without regard to the consumers' repayment
ability." 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h).
45
See, e.g., McKinney's Banking Law § 6-l (1), (2).
46
The remedies include actual damages, rescission, recoupment, reasonable attorney’s fees and others and are
supported by statutory damage provisions. See McKinney's Banking Law § 6-l (7), (8), (9), et seq.
47
See the discussion infra at 20.
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market turmoil. To date, the US law, especially, at the federal level, generally abstains from
direct intervention into high-cost and subprime loans except for greater disclosure requirements
to mortgagors and encouraging more market discipline by investors and asset managers.48
Legislative Dangers: Overregulation v. Underregulation
The present market havoc spotlighted that more government actions are required.
Proponents of the regulatory intervention highlight the market inefficiencies resulting from the
informational asymmetry49 and the disparity of high costs of the borrowers vis-à-vis the
exorbitant profits of the lenders [at the very least, until last summer]. Trumping the Coase
theorem by excessive transaction costs associated with the subprime market, it appears that the
subprime cannot be self-regulated efficiently. The question is where the golden mean between a
blind regulatory response to the subprime and predatory lending problems and more efficient
market regulation is.50
Prior to the crisis, a concern was that the government might affect the availability of
mortgage capital for many strata of population.51 The following credit crunch revealed that the
propensity to rent-seeking behavior against the backdrop of insufficient regulations and the lack
of uniformity in financing standards affected the availability of capital anyway. Under the market
and social pressure, the lenders started deliberating over lessening mortgage terms.52 Evidently,
new structural market and regulatory changes are imminent, what is furthermore instigated by
48

Policy Statement on Financial Markets Development, PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS
(DEPARTMENT OF TRESUARY, BOAR OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMMISSION) (March 2008) [hereinafter: the Policy Statement], 3 and
4.
49
See Engel and McCoy, supra note 41, at 1280-1289.
50
The federal government is extremely concerned about potential overregulation of the financial industries. The
Policy Statement, supra note 48.
51
Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State Regulation of Predatory Lending
(2003), 34-35, available at <http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/D881716A-1C75-11D5-AB7B00508B95258D/28871/PredReport200991.pdf>.
52
See, e.g, Laurie P. Cohen, Citigroup Feels Heat to Modify Mortgages, WSJ (November 26, 2007), at A1.
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the presidential campaign.53 The only concern is that public authorities need to avoid such
repercussions of overregulation as the further market stagnation.
The issue of overregulation versus underregulation is always a dilemma for politicians,
although it is more perceptible in some countries than others. The MBS crisis is unique in a sense
that it is accompanied by painful political and social ripples. Were it credit-default swaps which, as some believe, share similar traits with the subprime mortgage securities and are also
unregulated – consumers would be less worried about, e.g., the Citibank’s exposure.54
Yet, foreclosures and social ramifications, however important those may be, are only the
tip of the mortgage iceberg. No doubt, that “tip” will be much greater in developing economies,
including Russia, with much less judicial and social protection than exists in the US. However,
one cannot focus on the social side of the market problems. To no avail anti-predatory lending
advocates for years voiced their opposition to mortgage-backed securitization.55 Market
“socialism” simply does not work. The political agenda, therefore, should focus on how to limit
predatory lending practices, which come back to haunt financial institutions and investors. One
of the answers is better risk assessment.

53

Amy Chozick and Damian Paletta, Obama Calls for Oversight, Stimulus in Detailed Speech on Economic Plans,
WSJ (March 28, 2008). Sen. Obama called for a 30-billion economic stimulus plan and new plan to help
homeowners.
See also Transcript: Clinton on Economy, Mortgage Crisis and Trade, WSJ (March 27, 2008).
54
“No one knows how troubled the credit swaps market is, because, like the now-distressed market for subprime
mortgage securities, it is unregulated. But because swaps have proliferated so rapidly, experts say that a hiccup in
this market could set off a chain reaction of losses at financial institutions, making it even harder for borrowers to
get loans that grease economic activity. Commercial banks are among the biggest participants — at the end of the
third quarter of 2007, the top 25 banks held credit default swaps, both as insurers and insured, worth $14 trillion, the
currency office said, up $2 trillion from the previous quarter. JPMorgan Chase, with $7.8 trillion, is the largest
player; Citibank and Bank of America are behind it with $3 trillion and $1.6 trillion respectively.” Gretchen
Morgenson, Arcane Market Is Next to Face Big Credit Test, NY TIMES (February 17, 2008).
55
On the federal response to growing predatory lending practices, see, e.g., Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-Consumer
Approach to Predatory Lending: Enhanced Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to
Education, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 460, 461-462.
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3. Market Inefficiencies: Moral Hazard, Lack of Disclosure and Risk Assessment
The puzzle of risk assessment is manifold. A part of it is how to incentivize the lenders to
do more responsible underwriting and due diligence, and assure compliance. Then, a dilemma is
voluntary information disclosure by market participants.56 Investors, obviously, could not
evaluate the risks properly. One of the reasons was elaborate credit enhancements that gave them
the false feeling of safety.57 It might be true for small investors, although that does not explain
MBS purchases made by sophisticated corporate and institutional investors,58 who are no novices
at financial investment strategies. The present circumstances are illustrative of the fact that
overinvestments in formerly triple-A-rated securities and subprime MBS were based on the
investor reliance on the rating of the securities, instrument complexity and unavailability of
analytical data.
Rating Agencies as the Primary Market Gatekeepers
The information on potential delinquencies of triple-A MBS was unavailable and their
downgrading exceeds the worst estimations.59 Using synthetic derivatives, CDOs and other
numerous products in securitization60 and unreliability of the pool information make the need for
adequate information disclosure and transparency more pressing. The major rating agencies have

56

See, e.g., Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a World of Risk-Based Pricing, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 123
(2007). The author criticizes the present state of affairs and mentions that the current system of disclosure is
outdated as it was designed primarily for prime mortgage markets.
57
“As a result, investors [could] safely invest in top-rated subprimemortgage-backed securities without worrying
about losses, even when the underlying loan pools [were] replete with questionable loans.” Kathleen C. Engel and
Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039,
2041 (2007).
58
For instance, such huge corporations as Smucker, Garmin Ltd., Microsoft Corp. and others sustained MBS-related
losses. Karen Richardson, Why Firms Like Smucker May Feel Pinch of Debt Crunch, WSJ, (September 19, 2007),
at C1.
59
“S&P's rating actions touched on $534 billion in mortgage-related investments, including 47% of the U.S.
subprime mortgage bonds rated in 2006 and the first half of 2007.” Aaron Lucchetti, S&P Ramps Up Mortgage
Downgrades, WSJ (January 31, 2008), Page A3.
60
For an overview of the new changes, see, e.g., Gary Barnett, Synthetic Securitization and the Use of Derivatives in
Securitizations, 1653 PLI/Corp 489 (2008).
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apparently acknowledged some RMBS problems, including the limited scope of performance
reports and disclosure at the loan level, and the lack of transparency.61 That, however, happened
only recently. Up until early 2007, Standard & Poor's annually reported the reverse stating that it
“tend[ed] to overestimate the credit risk of senior subprime tranches.”62 Today, however,
downgrading of the very securities and conduits that had the same rating as the US government
securities proliferates and write-downs continue.63
Rating agencies play the indispensable role in structured finance as they are designed to
absorb the costs of screening out risky loans. Their primary function is to analyze “both credit
and property conditions for at least the most sizable or significant loans to be included in the loan
pool”64 and to provide recommendations on obtaining a higher investment-grade rating. The
raters65 are the engine of private-label securitization and the suppliers of low-cost information to
investors.66 Scrutinizing large mortgage pools was laden with prohibitive costs for lendersissuers and, ultimately, for individual mortgagors.67 Investors soon accepted the agencies’
blessings and excommunications, making a bad or absent rating “a death sentence”

68

for an

61

See Moody’s Investors Services, Structured Finance Special Reports, submitted by David Teicher, 899
PLI/COMM 15, 31 (2007).
62
Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy, supra note 57, at 2055.
63
“‘Banks are bracing for another chapter in the unfolding story of their mortgage-market problems,’ wrote Tanya
Azarchs, an S&P analyst, in a report released yesterday after the market closed.” Lucchetti, supra note 59.
64
Carl J. Seneker, How to Document Securitized Commercial Real Estate Mortgage Loans, SN001 ALI-ABA 1175
(2007).
65
Those are S&P, Moody’s and Fitch. SMMEA-qualified securities and mortgage-related securities within the
meaning of the 1933 Act were defined with the reference to “nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.”
(See 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(41)).
66
The privileged raters serve the role of “private suppliers of information, [whose opinions] in theory they can
facilitate the raising of capital by providing information to investors at a lower cost [… and] greatly influence the
ability of […] issuers to raise capital by lowering their costs and the decisions of some fiduciaries to invest.” Arthur
R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 341, 341342 (2006).
67
The pools of residential mortgage loans are assessed by national rating agencies starting from 1975, while the first
single-property and pools of commercial mortgage loans were rated in 1985 and 1987 respectively. For more
information, see, e.g., Shenker and Colletta, supra note 10.
68
David Reiss, Subprime Standardization: How Rating Agencies Allow Predatory Lending to Flourish in the
Secondary Mortgage Market, 33 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 985 (2006), 1056.
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RMBS offering. The countries, where MBS is still under way, recognize that the system of rating
is the key for successful securitization.69 The privileged raters exert considerable influence on the
mortgage market forging more standardized products and enhancing certain market trends,70
arguably, assuring the safety of investors.
One should not close eyes to the role that the credit raters play for law. Their strong
opposition71 to the Georgia’s anti-predatory lending statute72 that originally provided for liability
of lenders and assignees73 caused the legislature to amend the statute. The state’s apprehensions
were that the refusal to rate GA-originated mortgages would make them unmarketable. The
agencies clearly perceived the statute as excessively harsh as to most subprime loans, resulting in
punitive damages, potential class actions and the liability imposed on bona fide purchasers who
did reasonable due diligence prior to loan acquisitions.

74

For large lenders buying loans en

69

See, e.g., Oleg Ivanov, Legal Aspects of Securitization [“Zakonodatelnie Aspekty Sekiyuritizatsii”],
INFORMATIONAL PORTAL “IPOTEKA”. Available at <http://www.rusipoteka.ru/publications/ivanov-3.htm>
70
See, e.g., Andrew R. Berman, “Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage” – The Use (and Misuse of) Mezzanine
Loans and preferred Equity Investments, 11 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 76 (2005). The author argued that:
At first, mortgage financings helped fuel the development of the secondary mortgage market and commercial
mortgage backed securitizations. With the meteoric growth of the CMBS market, the power and significance of
national rating agencies also began to grow. As the rating agencies became more involved with real estate finance,
however, they inadvertently caused the decline of traditional junior mortgages and created the dramatic expansion of
mezzanine financings and preferred equity investments.
Id., at 125.
71
Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's to Disallow Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans (Jan. 16,
2003), available at <http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32153.htm>.
Fitch Ratings Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools Considers Impact to Other Predatory Lending
Legislation (Feb. 5, 2003), available at
<http://www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/32158.htm>.
Press Release, Moody's Investors Services, Moody's Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential
Mortgages in Securitizations (Jan. 30, 2003), available at
<http://www.mortgagebankers.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pd>.
72
Fair Lending Act, Ga. Code Ann. § § 7-6A-1 et seq.
73
Id.
74
Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-2(6). The APR (4%) and point and fees (3%) triggers were much lower than those of
HOEPA.
One problem was that the original statute covered not only high-cost mortgages, but also a broad range of “covered
home loans” with clearly subprime - although not excessively high-cost and predatory - provisions. The statute also
provided for punitive damages and class actions and did not fully or partially exempted from potential liability bona
fide purchasers who exercised reasonable due diligence when buying loans.
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masse, the statute was extremely hazardous due to the risks of inadvertent calculation errors.75
Most overreaching provisions were corrected by GA within a year.76
Other Supposed Gatekeepers and Lines of Defense
Another alleged “line of defense” of market “gatekeepers” is the lawyers. The legal
expertise is a part of every securitization transaction accompanied by numerous comfort letters,
“true sale,” “non-consolidation” opinions, etc. The significance of legal opinions was also
emphasized by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants.77 A legal counsel advises
not only the issuer, but also, in some cases, other parties to the transaction78 exercising due
diligence in rendering all opinions, drafting and negotiating purchase agreements, all necessary
representations and warranties by the sellers of mortgage assets and other documents.79

75

Most states, however, offer lenders good faith defenses in case lenders exercised reasonable due diligence in loan
origination and inadvertently committed a simple bona fide calculation error in originating high-cost mortgages.
Reformation of mortgage agreement and the corresponding restitution to the borrower solve the matter.
See, e.g., N.J. Stat. Ann. § 46:10B-29(c), etc.
76
Ga. Code Ann. § 7-6A-6(c) and (b).
77
The Institute issued guidance named “The Use of Legal Interpretations as Evidential Matter to Support
Management's Assertion That a Transfer of Financial Assets Has Met the Isolation Criteria in Paragraph 9 (a) of
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 140.” The American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
guidelines offer “extracts of legal opinions, which provide persuasive evidence (in the absence of contradictory
evidence) to support management's assertion that the transferred assets have been isolated. For an entity that is
subject to the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, a “would” opinion, not a “should” or “more likely than not” opinion must be
obtained. This represents the highest level of assurance counsel is able to provide on the question of isolation.” The
example follows:
“We believe [or it is our opinion] that in a properly presented and argued case, as a legal matter, in the event the
Seller were to become a Debtor, the transfer of the Financial Assets from the Seller to the Purchaser would be
considered to be a sale [or a true sale] of the Financial Assets from the Seller to the Purchaser and not a loan and,
accordingly, the Financial Assets and the proceeds thereof transferred to the Purchaser by the Seller in accordance
with the Purchase Agreement would not be deemed to be property of the Seller's estate for purposes of [the relevant
sections] of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.”
Moreover “[a]lthough not required by the auditing interpretation, the lawyer may also be providing an opinion on
the second step of a two-step structure involving a bankruptcy remote SPE, if requested by his client or the rating
agencies.” Mary Rosenblatt, Jim Johnson and James R. Mountain, Securitization Accounting: the Ins and Outs (and
Some Do’s and Don’t’s) of FASB 140, FIN 46R, IAS 39 and More, 891 PLI/COMM 847 (2006), 874.
78
Shenker and Colletta, supra note 10, 1376.
79
The expertise of legal counsels should be extensive enough to cover, for instance: [E]nsuring that desired legal
priorities are achieved, that security interests are properly perfected, and that subordination agreements are
enforceable; that indenture covenants are not violated and that covenant protections adequately balance debtor and
creditor needs; that commercial-law remedies made available upon insolvency or default work in harmony with
debtor-creditor law protections; that legal entities are established in the form (e.g., corporation, trust, partnership,
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Securities law compliance, prospectuses, private placement memoranda all depend on detailed
data on the underlying collateral and the projected yields on assets. These gatekeepers, working
in cooperation with accountants, also seemed to fail performing up to the standard as well.
Yet, it would be absurd to blame lawyers for the subprime debacle. In fact, it is not clear
what a lawyer working on a securitization deal might do, for instance, with respect to appraisals
of collateral. Obviously, there is always a potential for fraud on the part of, e.g., predatory
lenders and their attorneys, but it is hardly a separate issue requiring additional liability for
lawyers. As a part of the legislative response to the corporate scandals several years ago, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposed a reporting duty on lawyers in corporate settings. However, a
similar approach in multiparty MBS transactions seems unrealistic.
Regulatory Responses
The “arsenal” of statutory and judicial responses roughly includes
•

the enhanced oversight by regulatory agencies,

•

changing the general standards of liability, as applied to both categories of
financiers and the “gatekeepers,”

•

introducing temporary emergency programs for financial institutions and
borrowers in distress,

•

and designing profound modifications in regulatory policies.

limited liability company) and with the governance characteristics most effective for the task, given such competing
constraints as the tradeoff between equity-holder and creditor rights, bankruptcy law, tax law, and accounting; that
guaranties and other credit supports are legally enforceable; that any special-purpose entities achieve the applicable
legal requirements of rating agencies and investors, such as “true sale,” “non-consolidation,” and other “bankruptcy
remoteness” criteria; that cross-border legal demands are complied with; and that any securities law requirements
are met. Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 501502 (2007).
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Out of all four, the first and third alternatives appear to be the most feasible. As Prof.
Coffee suggested, promoting formalized gatekeepers’ responsibility80 may come from disclosure
mechanisms by dint of the extension of the SEC’s disclosure regimes. Furthermore, professional
standards may be raised by the self-regulatory organizations.81 Disclosures may be reviewed by
independent outside counsels82 and SEC can regulate the rating agencies. That seems more
realistic than the expansion of the standards of liability for the rating agencies for mistaken
ratings.83
The Congress acknowledged the prominent role of credit rating for securities markets84
and the need for competition among the agencies in enacting the Credit Rating Agency Reform
Act of 2006.85 The SEC already has the power to register86 rating agencies that intend to be
nationally recognized statistical rating organizations.87 The SEC continuously extends its

80

JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, Oxford
University Press, USA (2006), 232.
81
The Policy Statement, supra note 48.
82
Coffee, supra note 80, 231-232.
83
Coffee, supra note 30, 306. Id., 302-303. In fact, Prof. Coffee points at several downsides of enhanced liability of
the agencies and increasing litigations, although he concedes that “[r]ealistically […] a number of factors suggest
that credit-rating agencies will not face astronomic liabilities for flawed rating, even if its issuer/client becomes
insolvent.” Id., 303.
84
Information is a tradable commodity and, therefore, the legislature tend to support the equilibrium between market
demand for information and maintaining proper incentives for the producers of information to act in good faith.
Onnig H. Dombalagian, Licensing the Word on the Street: The SEC’s Rule in Regulating Information, 55 BUFF. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2007).
85
The Act was purported to “improve ratings quality for the protection of investors and in the public interest by
fostering accountability, transparency, and competition in the credit rating agency industry.” S.3850, An Act to
Improve Ratings Quality for the Protection of Investors and in the Public Interest by Fostering Accountability,
Transparency, and Competition in the Credit Rating Agency Industry, 891 PLI/COMM 1099, 1101 (2006).
86
15 U.S.C.A. § 78o-7. Among the data and information required for the registration, there are statistical data on the
performance of the applicant, his methodologies in evaluating ratings, internal information as to rules of ethics and
conflicts of interest and other. Id.
87
“(62) NATIONALLY RECOGNIZED STATISTICAL RATING ORGANIZATION.--The term ‘nationally
recognized statistical rating organization’ means a credit rating agency that-“(A) has been in business as a credit rating agency for at least the 3 consecutive years immediately preceding the
date of its application for registration under section 15E;
“(B) issues credit ratings certified by qualified institutional buyers, in accordance with section 15E(a)(1)(B)(ix),
with respect to-“(i) financial institutions, brokers, or dealers;
“(ii) insurance companies;
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regulatory reach. ABS and MBS are often placed with institutional investors. However,
“securitized securities” may be marketed through securities exchanges. A significant number of
no-action letters has accumulated since the 1990s. Some of them target disclosures, others - the
structure and covenants related to SPVs and other aspects common for almost every securitized
issue.88 In addition, the SEC’s securitization guidelines89 comprehensively covered most
securitized issues due to the principle-based definition of ABS. Extensive disclosure and loss
screening issues, mostly based on delinquency and loss statistical data, are the core of the
Regulation AB.90 By and large, this regulatory screening is warranted by not only the market
meltdown, but more so by the methodological innovations in rating. The SEC needs to

“(iii) corporate issuers;
Id., 1103 -1104.
88
E.g., “[i]n 1997, Commission staff issued a no-action letter clarifying that an asset pool having total delinquencies
of up to 20% at the time of the proposed offering may still be considered an “asset-backed security.” […] In 1997,
Commission staff issued a no-action letter clarifying that an asset pool having total delinquencies of up to 20% at the
time of the proposed offering may still be considered an “asset-backed security.” In addition, there also exists a
longstanding staff interpretive position that no non-performing assets may be included as part of the asset pool at the
time of the proposed offering. We are codifying these interpretations, with modifications from our original
proposal.” Id.
Most materials should evaluate the “data about the potential payouts of […] the asset-backed securities using
various prepayment and other assumptions as well as disclose information about the structure of the offering or
about the underlying asset pool.”
The new regulations also mandate certain specifics of SPVs, chiefly reiterating the well-accepted covenants required
in commercial MBS/ABS transactions, such as, e.g., the passive nature of SPVs and the common restrictions on
their activities. “The first condition is that neither the depositor nor the issuing entity is an investment company
under the Investment Company Act, nor will either become one as a result of the asset-backed securities transaction.
If either was the case, we continue to believe that the regime for asset-backed securities that we are adopting today
would not be appropriate. The second condition relates to the passive nature of the issuing entity in that its activities
must be restricted to the asset-backed securities transaction.” Id.
89
17 CFR §§ 210, 228, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 242, 245 and 249 . [Release Nos. 33-8518; 34-50905; File No. S721-04].
90
Definitions and treatment of delinquent and non-performing pool assets, and the distinctions between leasebacked transactions as opposed to true-sale pools were also clarified. The imperative catch-all feature of the rules is
the new disclosure requirements. “Before today, there were no disclosure items tailored specifically to asset-backed
securities. We are adopting, with modifications in response to comment, a new principles-based set of disclosure
items, “Regulation AB,” that will form the basis for disclosure in both Securities Act registration statements and
Exchange Act reports.” Id.
The screening problem associated with the pooled assets is also addressed through “requiring for the first time that
certain statistical information on a ‘static pool’ basis [such as delinquency and loss data, and prepayment data] be
provided if material to the transaction.” Id.
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accumulate more expertise in the rating technologies, what need to be bolstered by a
corresponding extension in its authority.91
There are several potential problems with this regime. The first is that the SEC is not a
rating agency in the sense that its methodologies will never be as effective and as proactive as
S&P’s and Moody’s, although the Commission clearly enjoys the benefit of hindsight. Yet, for
instance, Moody’s policy changes on loan level disclosure and transparency of pool
performance92 can be more effective than the SEC’s screening. As a part of future
methodological modifications, Moody’s unveiled its plan to consider using a “different rating
scale for structured securities [that] could provide greater clarity about differences” among bonds
“and could encourage market participants to consider the potentially different characteristics of
structured and nonstructured securities.”93 This, indubitably, will improve monitoring of MBS in
the future, alas, at present, the existing securities are continuously downgraded proving that MBS
“risk-based pricing [was] a misnomer.”94
Secondly, in light of the liability issues, the SEC’s approval of a rating method a priori
exonerates an agency using it. In sum, if the approved rater acts in good faith in rendering a
totally flawed opinion, as we have witnessed in the past, it cannot be held liable through either a
private or a public action. The latter will, probably, be precluded by the SEC’s endorsement. At
the same time, the SEC seems to be the only regulatory agency with sufficient expertise in
securities markets and which has the capacity to monitor the accuracy of ratings and screen out
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Dombalagian, supra note 84, 50.
Moody’s, supra note 61, 31. The agency changes its methodologies requiring MBS servicers to submit loan-level
information on monthly basis.
93
Aaron Lucchetti, Moody's Weighs Warning Labels For Its Ratings, WSJ (February 5, 2008); Page C1.
94
McCoy, supra note 56, at 127.
92

25

the conflicts of interest in the name of investor protection and public interest. 95
Out of the four aforementioned courses of action, the temporary anti-crisis proposals are
the most prevalent and flow from all divisions of the government. The Secretary of Treasury, for
instance, repeatedly called for more unification and standard licensing of mortgage brokers96
what had been also recognized in scholarly writings.97 New York, ahead of time, already designs
a public record database of mortgage brokers involved in criminal investigations that would
allow other state regulators to monitor the brokers. Educating consumers or advocating on behalf
of borrowers is another segment of many state programs. The New York State Banking
Department recently announced a request for proposals for $1.5 million available for the
provision of foreclosure prevention counseling, advocacy and legal services throughout New
York State.98
Some federal programs expected to stabilize the market are built on the existing
foundation of the conforming mortgages, the very same foundation that evolved and remained
sound and solid since the first MBS issues in the 1970s. One of the examples is FHASecure,
whose major goal is to offer refinancing to borrowers who defaulted on their loan payments due
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to the resets in interest rates.99 The Program was recently announced to be expanded to cover
ARMs, where borrowers were late on two or three consecutive payments or defaulted on
scheduled payments two or three times during the preceding 12 months.100 Similar programs
were proposed by congressmen, such as Senator Dodds’ “HOPE for Homeowners Act101 and
others.102
Most of the programs are either short-term or incomplete. For instance, the
Administration’s proposals, unfortunately, ignore some crucial amendments to the current FHA
program that may amplify its coverage even further.103 Namely, the expansion could also target
not only ARMs, but also delinquent conventional fixed-rate mortgages. The new program is
focused on rate resets, although there is no reason why it should allow refinancing to ARMs, but
not to high-cost fixed-rate mortgages, provided a mortgagor has made certain timely monthly
payments since the loan origination. I do not dispute that many subprime loans were ARMs, used
teaser rates and provided for significant rate resets, but, given the recessionary economic
environment, foreclosures clearly hit fixed-rate mortgages as well. In any case, it is self-evident
that, again, taking into account the present state of economy, prior delinquency should not
automatically disqualify all borrowers from participation in the Program as it may not be a
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definite indicator of future defaults.104
Foreclosure may become a more expensive option for lenders and servicers of
securitization vehicles, than entering into FHASecure refinancing. It gradually loses its appeal as
the real estate prices hit record low and the net proceeds can turn out to be significantly less than
the original loans, particularly, in the areas experiencing significant numbers of foreclosures.
Subprime and predatory mortgage origination was characterized by imprudent property
assessments and, in some cases, the absence of verification of borrowers’ income, what made
mortgage-backed securities significantly mispriced.105 A corresponding advantage of employing
the FHA technologies is their income and property appraisal verification techniques through
which loan mispricing will be corrected or at least mitigated, thus, making loan payments more
affordable to mortgagors.
From the point of view of lenders and investors, government insurance continuously
supports a vibrant secondary market for FHA loans.106 Compared to most non-conforming loans
and collateralized securities, FHA loans and securities are currently priced almost at par. A
simple expansion of the existing government insurance programs may achieve two goals
simultaneously: to support the secondary market and to help more borrowers avoid foreclosure.
An interesting observation is that proposals from the Congress and the federal regulators
envision more government entities being involved in the mortgage market. The project of
104
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Senator Dodds calls for creating a yet another government overseeing entity107 that would
control the details of the project execution and the distribution of the new $20 billion federal
subsidy. Similarly, the Treasury Blueprint plans for establishing a special office responsible for
mortgages and for the general overhaul of the administrative system. It is questionable how well
new entities will work and how expediently can they build up expertise in their related regulatory
areas. Merging various regulatory agencies and creating new ones is an old proposition, which
currently looks slightly out of place, when consumer finance and the mortgage market call for
more expedient and effective modifications. To recapitulate, more disclosure and the temporary
extension of the existing quasi-market facilities, such as FHA, may bring about tangible results
much more expediently then devising theoretical innovations.
At the same time, the subprime MBS failures, obviously, can be mitigated, but cannot be
solved by addressing a series of dispersed problems and a unified public policy agenda should be
developed. To some, the US has a crazy-quilt regulatory system, although it is highly unlikely
that there will be a sole financial supervisor akin to, e.g., the British FSA, in the foreseeable
future. It appears that the Treasury Blueprint will be a partially futile endeavor and it remains to
be seen which of the proposals will actually be brought to life, if any. As opposed to structural
reforms, concerted actions of all regulators of financial industries and mutual information
exchange can result in more immediate and effective outcomes.
Consumer Protection and the Need for Regulatory Cooperation
In light of the significant federal preemption of state banking law and visitorial powers
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with respect to national banks,108 the cooperation of federal and state bank supervisors becomes a
pressing issue. At the state level, New York Banking Department has already initiated
roundtables with state prosecutors and the Treasury on the predatory lending and mortgage
fraud.109 Also, in July 2007, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of
Thrift Supervision, the Federal Trade Commission, and state agencies110 planned on launching a
joint program aimed at supervising banks, thrifts with the emphasis on subprime lenders and
their mortgage brokers. The cooperation was supposed to improve the supervision over mortgage
lending across various participants of the subprime industry. Even rating agencies – which only
three years ago resisted anti-predatory lending programs of state regulators - embrace more state
supervision in the belief that “the securitization market would benefit from oversight authorities
addressing lenient underwriting and the potential for fraud through more stringent licensing and
additional supervision of mortgage brokers.”111
The “potential for fraud” is not fraud as such, even though a layman can think so. In
March 2007, several bank regulatory agencies112 issued a Statement on Subprime Mortgage
Lending in which they indicated that subprime mortgage lending is not illegal or hazardous per
se, but should be balanced in view of public policy considerations and safe and sound banking
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and underwriting standards.113 All these proposals go along with the broad notion of disclosure at
all levels: investors, servicers and mortgagors.
A yet another strategy is expanding the remedies available to borrowers under TILA and
state law on high-cost loans. For instance, New York State imposes restrictions on the terms of
high-cost loans, including, inter alia, interest, finance charges, and prohibits certain practices
with respect to such loans.114 Through limiting the proportionate share of various charges as to
the total amount of a home loan, the law does not undermine the banks’ sources of profits as did
Regulation Q, for example, but, potentially, assures a lesser portion of delinquent loans and
foreclosure actions for lenders or servicers of MBS. In fact, the statutory limitations protecting
mortgagors may be conducive to the long-term sustainability of the financial markets and
promoting the safe and sound banking practices. That may be particularly evident when the
foreclosure risks become more systemic as the market deteriorates.
Running a few steps ahead, for Russia, where the general concern is that a specter of
another banking crisis is looming over the industry as the portion of bad debt in the banks’
portfolios keeps mounting,115 a duet of information disclosure accompanied by restrictions on
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high-cost loans may be more effective than any one of the foregoing measures alone. Clearly,
what suffices for a mature market experiencing a short-term stagnation may not be enough for a
developing market. In Russia, which, despite the lengthy Mortgage Statute,116 de facto offers
much less protection to mortgagors, solely educational and disclosure provisions may be
inadequate.
One characteristic of the US law that is unique and untransplantable to other jurisdictions
is the federal preemption and the regulatory discord in the banking industry. Under the National
Bank Act and the Home Owners Loan Act117 federally-chartered banks and thrifts are in many
respects beyond the regulatory reach of state authorities. The preemption has been supported by
judiciary and the Supreme Court.118 Both the OCC and OTS119 traditionally promoted the
preemption of state laws in many areas, including real estate loans.120 The 2004 decision by the
2nd Circuit further limited the visitorial powers of states, including in the course of criminal
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Turns to be a Trap [“Potrebitelskie kredity stanoviatsia lovushkoy”], FINANCIAL NEWS [“GAZETA
FINANSOVYE IZVESTIA”] (March 21, 2006) at <http://fin.izvestia.ru/cfin/tmpl-art/id_art-995572>.
116
The Federal Law “On Hypothec (Pledge of Immovables)” [“Оb ipoteke (zaloge nedvijimosty)”] No. 102-ФЗ of
July 16, 1998 (the latest consolidated version is of December 30, 2004, No. 216-ФЗ) (hereinafter: the Mortgage
Statute)
117
12 USCA §§ 1461, 1462, 1462a, 1463, 1464, 1466, 1466a, 1467, 1467a, et seq.
118
In Tiffany, the Supreme Court held that:
It cannot be doubted, in view of the purpose of Congress in providing for the organization of the National banking
associations, that it was intended to give them a firm footing in the different States where they might be located. […]
National banks have been National favorites. They were established for the purpose, in part, of providing a currency
for the whole country, and in part to create a market for the loans of the General government. It could not have been
intended, therefore, to expose them to the hazard of unfriendly legislation by the States, or to ruinous competition
with State banks. Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409, 412-413 (1873). For example, the court in
Phipps stated that all closing costs were within the meaning of “interest” under federal law as defined by law and the
OCC.” Phipps v. Guaranty National Bank of Tallahassee. 2003 WL 22149646 (2003), 417 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir.
2005)
119
12 U.S.C. § 1464(a).
120
First Nat. Bank v. California, 262 U.S. 366, 369 (1923). 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(2) In its regulations, the OCC
stipulated that a “national bank may make real estate loans […] without regard to State law limitations [, including
those related to] schedule for the repayment of principal and interest.” Those concern, in particular, “processing,
origination, servicing, sale or purchase of, or investment or participation in, mortgages,” as well as interest rates on
loans.69 Fed. Reg. 109; 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a)(10), (12)

32

investigations by Attorney Generals.121
Outside of courtrooms, regulators usually accuse each other of market failures attempting
to demonstrate the need to take away/return their authority. In February, in a response to
accusatory comments by the former New York Governor Eliot Spitzer, the Comptroller issued a
press release arguing that the worst abuses came from mortgages originated by state-licensed
mortgage brokers and lenders, 122 not the OCC-regulated banks. The validity of these statements
is dubious and statistics do not support either accusation.
It is a fact that the predominant majority of key financial institutions are under the federal
charter. Let us take a perfunctory look at some 10Ks. Wells Fargo & Company is a corporation
organized under the laws of Delaware and is a financial holding company and a bank holding
company registered under the Bank Holding Company Act.123 Washington Mutual, Inc., is
incorporated in the state of Washington and is a savings and loan holding company subject to the
regulation by OTS. Its banking subsidiaries – such as, e.g., Washington Mutual Bank - are also
within the jurisdiction of federal regulators and FDIC.124 CitiFinancial Credit Company
(hereinafter: CCC) is a component of the U.S. Consumer Lending business and an indirect
wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup held through Associates. Associates First Capital
Corporation is a wholly owned subsidiary of Citigroup.125 Based on their 2006 10K, JPMorgan
Chase & Co. is a financial holding company incorporated under Delaware law. JPMorgan
Chase’s principal bank subsidiaries are JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Association, a national
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banking association with branches in 17 states, and Chase Bank USA, National Association.126
So, unless the OCC believed that all of them had nothing to do with the origination of subprime
mortgages or if they referred in their press release to only state lenders and brokers who
committed fraud, the statement lacks validity. Obviously, no one accuses the aforesaid financial
institutions in law violations as subprime does not equal predatory, although one may lead to
another.
Some sort of political bickering may continue for some time in the future. Yet, more
constructive voices are also heard. In one of his recent speeches, New York Superintendent of
Banks Richard Neiman, for instance, called to “embrace a new form of federalism, one which
highlights states in their traditional role as overseers of the real estate market in their
jurisdictions. The preemption debate implies another underlying question: is it more appropriate
for the mortgage business to be supervised predominantly at the federal level, or also at the state
level as it is currently? I’d like to give an unequivocal answer: effective regulation of this
industry absolutely necessitates a balanced partnership with an engaged and proactive state
government.”127
Conclusions
A better cooperation among various agencies should not signify that the lending industry
is about to become over-regulated. That would clearly run contrary to the legislative tendencies
of the last decades, including the lessening of the regulatory regime, the repeal of the Glass-
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Steagall Act128 and other novelties. It is more probable that the enhanced disclosure rules and
transparency would become the key tools of regulatory agencies. Some measures, such as
FHASecure, will remain temporary, others, like state mortgage counseling may become
embedded into state law permanently. It is evident that given the speed of financial innovations,
such statutes as TILA, consumer protection laws, the disclosure requirements in mortgage and
securities law and monitoring of rating agencies should be subject to systemic, not ad hoc,
reviews by the authorities responding to business cycles. Finally, it is also clear that the present
crisis hardly necessitates a substantial overhaul of the regulatory structure, what would be both
protracted and costly in terms of time and financial resources.

4. History Lessons and Market Periodization of the US Mortgage-Backed Securitization
Let us now turn to the transplanting issues and the lessons that other jurisdiction can learn
from the history of securitization and the described above anti-crisis policies. Before the current
crisis erupted, it was widely acknowledged that, for real estate markets, MBS were a positive
innovation in terms of both social and market policies. MBS made mortgages more affordable
through providing mortgage originators with easier access to secondary mortgage and capital
markets. It should be emphasized that, the evolution of US mortgage-backed securitization was a
century long. The periodization of the development of this instrument may be outlined through
the following periods: (1) from the 19th century through the Great Depression, (2) from 1940s
until the late 1960s, (3) the 1980s-1990s and (3) the past several years.
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The first stage exhibited the two main traits, namely, wide-range market innovations
against a comparative lack of regulation on the part of state authorities and insufficient market
discipline. In that time period, the early market-driven experiments were made with securities
used for financing construction projects. Those occurred from approximately the mid 19th
century to the Great Depression. The geographical distribution of such novelties was very
uneven with the concentration around New York City real estate projects.129 The most
fundamental criterion differentiating this period is that it was the market initiative as such that
procreated new ways to access cheap capital and to turn mortgages into liquid securities.
This is the time period when one can discern some similarities between the US before the
Depression and emerging markets, such as was Russia from the collapse of communism to the
major Russian financial crisis of 1998. The relative federal statutory and institutional vacuum
existing in both countries, as well as the lack of market discipline instigated market agents and
spawned innovative fraud and trust schemes.130 The proponents of the post-communist shocktherapy approach, as well as many moderate reformers all agreed that in the early 1990s the
“anxious state of affairs thus raise[d] the question whether commercial law reforms designed to
enforce market discipline in Russia were too late.”131 As history proved,132 it was a disastrous
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havoc as the party believing that “economic liberalization had to precede market discipline
laws”133 had taken over and the necessary statutes were developed only later, particularly, after
the 1998 crisis. In fact, the atmosphere of lawlessness intertwined with the laissez-faire public
policies were similar in both the US before the Depression134 and the RF before 1998.
The second time-period of securitization in the US is signified by the emergency
measures introduced via direct government involvement in a salvation attempt during the Great
Depression and later on. As I have mentioned above, the present credit crunch cannot be denoted
as a “depression” and the government policies represent more a variation of the existing statutory
templates and federal programs. The only possible exception is more state regulation of high-cost
loans and closer regulatory scrutiny of rating agencies, auditing firms through the SOA and other
statutes.
Some legislative securitization landmarks are explained by the interest-group cycle
theory. The theory may be organically embedded into a more general taxonomy of business
cycles by Arthur Schlesinger. The general hypothesis is based on the alterations of private
interest and public actions, where the latter coincides with social or economic instability in the
country, namely, 1832, 1860, 1900, 1932, and the 1960s preceded by private actions flourishing
around the 1890s, 1920s, 1950s and 1980s.135 Business is sometimes portrayed as “the most
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powerful social force with the possible exception of the federal government.”136 The timing of
ebbing power of market producers correlates with new regulatory reforms and the growth of
counterpoising social movements. The Great Depression and the New Deal initiatives in
mortgage financing depicted that trend.137
The crash of the banking system of the 1930s disrupted the customary practices of
localized mortgage financing as the mortgagors were distrustful of local banks sensitive to the
contagion of financial breakdowns of “money-center” banks.138 For local banks, mass defaults by
borrowers were one of the major concerns calling for government’s attention. The Congress soon
responded by establishing the Federal Home Loan Bank System,139 particularly, in order to
support local lenders. The US government also temporarily accepted the role of “the lender of
last resort” towards the US citizens when the Congress introduced short-term measures provided
for by the Home Owners' Loan Act.140 The newly created Home Owners’ Loan Corporation
(hereinafter “HOLC”)141 helped out about one million mortgagors unable to make mortgage
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payments under preexisting terms.142 The HOLC’s rate of foreclosures was quite low considering
the riskiness of its activities and amounted to approximately 20% of the total mortgages
refinanced.143 Most of the sales occurred in the late 30s and early 40s, what showed the central
purpose of HOLC: to stabilize the market and to delay the sales until the economy and the
financing industries have coped with the recession.144
Another nearly immediate administrative response by the Congress came as the Federal
Housing Administration145 (FHA) and the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA)146 in
1938. The latter, until the reforms of the late 1960s, dealt primarily with conforming mortgages,
i.e., mortgages insured by FHA. One of the main purposes of FNMA was providing liquidity for
mortgages by buying and selling mortgages in times of a shortage and a surplus of real estate
lending capital on the market.
Financial Research Program: Studies in Urban Mortgage Financing. New York: National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc. (1951).
142
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The US system of the government mortgage insurance through FHA has been the nucleus
of securitization for long time since its inception in 1934. The experience of FHA, FNMA and
HOLC may be valuable examples for Russia. In addition to the general susceptibility of the
Russian economy to the global credit crunch, there are, as mentioned above, growing domestic
concerns regarding “bad debt” in bank portfolios. Hence, some form of government mortgage
insurance may be advisable for Russia, where structured finance is taking off.
In the US, the “evolution” of structured finance took some time and only the 1970s
witnessed the changes in the secondary mortgage market significant to such an extent that the
trade of the two preceding decades was outshone as quite trivial.147 The third period, the period
of growth, started approximately in the late 1960s with introducing more government’s
innovations and continued through the boom of the markets for real estate and MBS to the
instability of 1983-1987, when the market emergency caused another series of legislative
innovations. This period can be characterized as a successful realization of the project conceived
about thirty years ago, scilicet, when FNMA was broken down to two agencies - FNMA and
GNMA - FHLMC was created and both launched new MBS programs and were allowed to deal
in conventional mortgages. Finally, with the first private issuance of collateralized securities by
Bank of America in 1977, the private market infiltrated the field of securitization.148
The 1960s were a troubling period for the Federal Reserve and the US Government.
First, inflation was rising with quite disturbing speed from the mid 1960s,149 what caused a
series of credit crunches in the 1960s and disturbed the mortgage industry. Second, the
147
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international ambience contributed to the national economic stagnation. Inasmuch as the US
dollar became substantially overvalued as a result of the Bretton Woods Agreement and the
affiliated policies, American export suffered, while inflation kept growing.150 Third, the
mortgage industries experienced a severe lack of capital. Given the shortage of mortgage lending
funds, the government found a solution in capital markets as a potential source of financing real
estate. Fourth, the countries-producers of crude oil were about to change the nature of the oil
industry ousting the “Seven Sisters” from the Middle East.151 Fifth, the demographic alterations
helped undermine the common equilibrium of deposit-lending practices by thrifts. Particularly,
this was due to several reasons. One the one hand, the so-called baby boomers had grown up by
the 1970s, thus, increasing the demand for residential real estate. On the other hand, while the
main source of mortgage capital remained the savings made by local community members - who,
by and large, were older and more prosperous than those borrowing to purchase first homes –
that could not meet the demand of younger generations. The concurrent problem was that,
before the reforms in the early 1970s, mortgage lending was geographically segmented and
inexorably connected to local savings and loans associations and banks. The “spread banking”
dominated the business of banking.152
The Senate Committee on Banking and Currency intended to expand FNMA purchasing
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authority to conventional mortgages153 and to charge FNMA with the responsibilities to issue
mortgage-backed securities, what the agency had been long planning to do. The proposed Senate
bills were later signed into the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970.154 First, the Bill
expanded the customer base of FNMA to conventional mortgages and established quite solid
safeguards for diminishing the risks of the entity. Secondly, the Bill proposed establishing the
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation155 with the purpose to purchase mortgages - instead
of providing mortgage warehousing facilities only - from the federal home loan banks156 subject
to the same requirements as were established for FNMA conforming mortgages. FNMA and
FHMLC obligations are not backed by the full faith and credit of the US government, but they
have close ties with the government. Since the inception of the securitization programs, FNMA
and FHMLC enjoyed an exemption from federal securities registration and other requirements
imposed by SEC in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933.157
Generally, in the 1970s and 1980s, the development of the secondary market for PMBS
was hampered as “without a GSE issuer and the credit enhancement from a government
guarantee, the Wall Street market would not consider a Private Label MBS to be equivalent to a
GSE issued MBS.”158 Today, PMBS are once again deemed risky securities compared to
government-insured MBS. In the 80s, it was acknowledged that GSEs crowded out private MBS.
That was before standardized documentation, proper credit enhancements and investment grade
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ratings became the common characteristics the PMBS market in the late 1980s and through the
1990s. The absence of standardized loan and underwriting criteria and “the lack of a welldeveloped secondary market for commercial mortgage loans”159 also contributed to a slower
growth of PMBS. 160 Overall, until the late 1980s, private label securitization lagged behind its
government-sponsored counterpart what, taken together with the wretched state of the mortgage
financing industry,161 aggravated by inflationary pressures, warranted further reforms.
In summer 1982, the 22-member Presidential Commission on Housing and a rival task
force appointed by the House of Representatives started independent investigations of the
residential real estate market and mortgage financing. The goals of the Presidential Commission
were to find the ways to lessen the burdens of the federal budget and to reorganize federal
housing programs, on the one hand; and to examine financial condition of the savings and loan
industry, on the other. The approaching thrift crisis, which erupted later, in the late 1980s and
continued through the early 1990s, “placed enormous stress on the statutory and administrative
system for resolving depository institutions failures, a lazy backwater of the law since the
1930s.”162
The forthcoming increase in commercial securitization was encouraged by several
factors, including the well-tested use of credit enhancement mechanisms – such as, inter alia,
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bank guarantees, letters of credit, surety bonds, over-collaterization and others - the new trends
in bankruptcy and corporate law facilitating bankruptcy remoteness of the SPVs, and easier
registration requirements for private issues of MBS.163
It was indispensable to increase investors’ base for private MBS by means of legislative
reforms. The Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984 worked in this direction
improving marketability of private-label MBS by creating SMMEA-qualified securities, which
were MBS assigned a double-A rating or higher by the nationally recognized credit rating
agencies. The demand side for such private securities was then expanded reaching out to federal
banks, credit unions and thrifts, which were allowed to invest in private mortgage-related
securities.164 State regulations and investment laws with regard to state-chartered depositary
institutions and insurance companies were preempted165 and state financial institutions were
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allowed to invest in MBS, as defined in the Securities and Exchange Act, in a similar way they
were entitled to invest in Treasury securities and GSE MBS under legal investment laws.166
The major objective of the reforms was to level the playing field for public and private
MBS issuers, lessen the federal government insurance risks and draw more private capital in
mortgage financing. The regulatory flaw that transpired recently was that the reforms did not
account for market innovations, which require seasonal reviews and alterations in disclosure
requirements, consumer protection laws, including TILA, and banking regulation and oversight.
This approach seemed justified for several decades. GSEs and private-label MBS were for years
seen as instruments furthering the American dream.
As a relatively new phenomenon, securitization was perceived as a positive “neologism
used to describe the transformation of illiquid financial claims, often held by depository financial
intermediaries, into tradeable”167

standardized commodities only 20 years ago. Recently,

securitization was still seen as an intensively developing phenomenon “reputed to be by far the
most rapidly growing segment of the U.S. credit markets, and its use [was] rapidly expanding
worldwide.”168 To recapitulate, liquidity, or more correctly “illiquidity” inherent to the nature of
mortgages, was among the underlying stimuli of mortgage-backed securitization. The reasons
were that “like an interest in an unincorporated business, each mortgage was unique [and its
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contractual terms] tended to vary greatly from lending institution to lending institution,”169 and
that “the investor risk in each mortgage varied according to the strength of the mortgage
collateral and the ability of the borrower to pay.”170 With the rise of GSEs and new regulatory
policies,171 the latter group of risks became less pronounced for conforming mortgages.
Later on, private mortgage markets offered investors higher yields, secondary market
liquidity, and “more protection by way of collateral overages and/or guarantees by entities with
high and stable credit ratings,”172 as well as an assurance that the structural credit enhancements
are sufficient safeguards testifying the appropriate quality of the collateral. These structural
“warranties” decreasing costs to investors appeared “the single largest factor in the growth of the
structured finance market.”173 In view of the present crisis, that eulogy now seems hazardously
exaggerated. The actions that the US government may undertake in collaboration with the market
in the next several months will be determinative as to not only the domestic markets, but the
global financial markets in general.
The methods how the US has been addressing the problems of financial markets in the
past three decades are the most important for the developing countries in search for the best
transplantable models. Particularly, it concerns the potential dangers concomitant to mortgagebacked securitization, such as predatory lending, over- or under-regulation of private securities
and banking sectors, which may require urgent state measures such as, inter alia, SMMEA or
changes in the federalization principles as applied to national banks, the evolution of judicial
169
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thinking depicted through such problematic cases as Clarke174 or Kingston Square Associates175
or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act post-Enron. The range of responses to the current crisis is still an
open question.
Today, we are in the fourth critical period of the development of structured finance
products. The changes in mortgage law, securities regulations or business associations law
introduced through the government policies and self-regulatory organizations continuously affect
the methods of financing.176 Even though legal transplanting is no panacea for most countries
and, as Profs. Pistor and Richard pointed out, “unreceptive” transplants, i.e., those where a
foreign model does not produce the same effect as in the country of origin, occur more often than
not,177 general methods of financing and regulation are unambiguously converging.178 The
Russian nascent MBS practices clearly demonstrate that.
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5. The Russian and US Mortgage Financing Models
Certain traits of the Russian structured finance remind of the US mortgage financing in
the 1980s-1990s. First, mortgage financing is clearly on the public agenda.179 Secondly, there is a
juxtaposition of a relative stability of banking and the perceptible lack of mortgage capital.
Gradually, while the public appetite for investments is growing, the banks give up their nearly
monopolistic positions as capital providers to mutual funds, insurance companies and other
financial companies.180 The origins of that lack of bank capital are, clearly, distinct in both
countries. In Russia, unable to tap the sources of consumer finance, national banks are outplayed
by globalization, as large commercial borrowers prefer to address international markets, while
foreign financial instructions are entering into the RF.181 Even supposing that Russian mutual
funds and investment vehicles are not yet mature enough to compete with banks, international
competition increasingly impacts the Russian markets and becomes hard-edged forcefully calling
for more financial innovations.182 In the US and globally, banking products are converging, what
includes the methods of procuring more bank capital through structured finance products and
other innovations. There is a conspicuous need for expanding product boundaries of traditional
banking in Russia, as there was in the US until the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.
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Thirdly, for the purposes of housing finance, Russia, similar to the US, is, theoretically,
able to provide direct guarantees or mortgage insurance.183 Even though the origins of the
aforementioned economic traits and the corresponding histories of the markets are inherently
different in both countries, legal transplanting and globalization make financial practices
formally analogous. As closer examined, attempting to stimulate the mortgage market, Russia
has adopted the general securitization template designed in the US.
Mortgage Financing In Russia: Adaptation of the US Securitization Model
In 2006, the share of mortgage transactions in the residential market was about 8.6%,
while the rest were cash-based transactions.184 Mortgage loans were and still are unaffordable to
many Russian citizens185 due to high interest rates, substantial down payments required by banks
and rigid payment schedules. Russia did not have a baby boom like in the US, in fact, the
Russian population is decreasing.186 The origin of the housing demand for more affordable loans
proceeds from the transfer from Soviet public housing to privatized dwellings and from higher
standards of living effecting consumer preferences of younger generations. Government
authorities and housing agencies on several occasions noted that the structural problems of
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mortgage markets may be resolved through promoting securitization,187 what was the case in the
US in the 1970s.
The mounting attention of the Russian government to MBS appeared approximately from
the year 2000 with the enactment of the Strategy “On Residential Mortgage Loans”188 followed
by the initiatives of the Russian GSE – the Agency for Home Mortgage Lending (hereinafter:
AHML). AHML developed the first Standards of originating, refinancing and servicing
mortgage loans in 2002 and issued the first MBS in 2003 in accordance with the new Statute on
MBS.189 A series of new statutes necessary for securitization, such as the Statute “On Banks and
the Business of Banking,”190 “On Bankruptcy,”191 “On Bankruptcy of Credit Institutions,”192 the
new strategies of banking development and the regulations of the Central Bank, were amended in
line with the new Statute. The early initiatives of AHML, however, ended up in a failure.
The federal government soon corrected the structural flaws and approved in 2005 the
Guidelines [“Kontseptsia”] for the Development of the Unified System of Mortgage
Refinancing. Finally, in May 2007, the first private placement of Russian AHML signified the
new era in housing policies. Similar to the US, the national securitization markets are produced
through the state support. National PMBS issues are rare in Russia, while several foreign
transactions with Russian MBS date back to July 2006. Most of those international transactions
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were structured by foreign SPVs – those are mainly registered in three jurisdictions: the
Netherlands, Luxembourg or Ireland - and were placed through foreign underwriters.193 One of
the first successful Russian MBS were sold through Gazprombank in November 2006.194 “As of
31 December 2006, 332,030 USD of the mortgage loan portfolio were securitized by the
[Gazprombank] Group by means of several issues of mortgage backed securities,”195 most of
them were cross-border MBS.196 That issue was closely followed by the first AHML’s MBS
issued in May 2007 and assigned a higher credit rating due to, inter alia, a state guarantee of the
issue.197
It is too early to identify explicit indicia speaking to the presence of a local MBS market
or a national PMBS market. First, only a few successful issues have been placed so far.
Secondly, even though Gazprombank is a private commercial bank, it also has close ties with the
Government through OAO Gazprom198 and about 8% of its stock is owned by the Treasury.199

193

Within the past 18 months, the Moskommertsbank (a Dutch SPV) placed securities through HSBC Bank PLC,
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Österreich AG (RZB), Sovfintrade (two SPVs in Luxembourg) – via Gasprombank (which is
its mother company); Barclays Capital, with participation of Lehman Brothers International (Europe) and HSBC
Bank PLC for the second issue; Delta-Credit (an Irish SPV) - Societe Generale; Gorodskoy Ipotechny Bank [City
Mortgage Bank] (a Dutch SPV) - VTB Bank Europe (acquired by Vneshtorgbank in 2006), Greenwich Financial
Services; Vneshtorgbank (an SPV registered in Luxembourg) - Barclays Capital, HSBC Bank PLC. All transactions
are listed in retrospective order starting from July 2007 to July 2006. Source: The Analytical Portal “Rusipoteka.”
Available at <http://www.rusipoteka.ru/issue.htm>.
194
Sovfintrade was acquired by Gazprombank in March 2006. The MBS were rated Ваа2 by Moody's and provided
for 30-year term till redemption. Id.
195
Consolidated Financial Statements. Independent Auditor’s Report (ZAO Deloitte and Touche CIS),
Gazprombank Group (December 2006), 35. Available at
<http://www.gazprombank.ru/media/papers/annual_reports/2006/ar06.pdf >.
196
Namely those were “domestic Ruble-denominated residential mortgage backed securities […] in the amount of
USD 113,934 thousand and […] both Euro- and Ruble-denominated cross-border RMBS issue in the amount of
USD 218,644 thousand.” Id., 46.
197
Class A was rated A3, Class B – Ba1 by Moody's. Subordinated class C was unrated. See Pre-Sale Report. First
Mortgage Agent of AHML. Moody’s Investors Service (April 2007). Available at <
http://www.ahml.ru/agent/analysis.shtml?path=analysis070515-2.html >.
198
AOA Gazprom holds 41.73% of shares of the bank, while 42.89% belong to ZAO “Leader” on behalf of
Gazfond. Id., 1.
199
The Treasury stock is 8.34%. Id.

51

Therefore, delimiting the private and public camps in the nascent MBS markets in Russia is quite
complicated.
Hypothetically, the general taxonomy of the MBS markets in any country can be divided
into agency and private MBS, what predetermines the nature of issuers operating in those market
segments and the risks of investors. In the US, the issuers of private-label MBS are special
purpose conduits of banks, thrifts, investment banking firms, and a variety of non-bank financial
companies, which are either non-existent or less prominent in the Russian national finance
compared to banks. The other group of issuers in both countries should be government agencies.
GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC are linked to the US government and, as mentioned above,
initiated and spearheaded the whole process. To recapitulate, FNMA and FHLMC are not
government entities, but corporate instrumentalities of the government. As quasi-private
corporate entities they do not enjoy the government protection against credit risks associated
with their securities. They pay taxes as any regular corporation and do not receive government
subsidies; and their shares are traded at NYSE.200 The third agency – GNMA – is a governmental
one included in the Department of Housing and Urban Development. Limited in their programs
by guaranteeing securitized pools of mortgages, GNMA’s obligations carry the full faith and
credit of the American government.201
AHML is, in principal, similar to FNMA before its privatization in 1968. Today, the
Agency is on the list of the federal state strategic enterprises and is 100% owned by the federal
government. Yet, the Agency has its own legal personality and is not a government
instrumentality. The state is not liable under the obligations of the Agency, unless it has

200
201

See the official web-sites of the GSEs at http://www.fanniemae.com/ and http://www.freddiemac.com.
See the official web-site of GNMA at http://www.ginniemae.gov.

52

explicitly undertaken such obligations.202 The state support of AHML MBS is based on state
guarantees granted for the purposes of separate MBS issues. Under the current law on state
guarantees, budget, tax law and contract law, the lack of blanket state insurance can lead to
protracted bureaucratic delays as to ad hoc insuring specific tranches or issues and to an increase
in costs associated with MBS.203
As opposed to AHML, the market for conforming mortgages in the US provides for a
two-tier credit enhancement to the investors. First, the mortgages are insured by FHA. Second,
the pools of mortgages collateralizing securities are guaranteed by GSEs. In Russia, AHML’s
standards, instead, require several layers of private insurance, the costs of which are totally borne
by the mortgagors. The general structure of the origination of Russian “conforming” mortgages,
to wit, conforming to the requirements of AHML, looks as follows. Mortgagors address primary
lenders, servicing agents, or the so-called regional “operators.” Those pool the mortgages and
address AHML for refinancing their loans, which should comply with certain criteria.204 The
Agency offers a list of mandatory documents including a standard loan agreement and a
mortgage note, a sale agreement, a mortgage deed (“zakladnaya”),205 property assessment forms
and others.206 Several types of obligatory private insurance policies should be acquired by the
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borrower covering the risks related to property itself, the health and life of the borrower and a
potential loss of income.207
In general, the Agency’s requirements stipulate very strict and narrow boundaries as to
conforming mortgages. The mortgage term to maturity, for instance, should be between 12 - if
the remaining balance is not less than 100,000 Rubles or, approximately, 4,000 USD - and 360
months and all mortgages must be originated in Russian Rubles only – although some banks
offer products in foreign hard currencies - with an interest rate defined strictly in accordance
with the AHML standards.208 Notably, the outstanding balance on a mortgage should be between
30% and 90% of the value of the collateral residential real estate and the payment schedules
should accomodate only the fixed-rate mortgage structure,209 unless the Agency grants a
preliminary consent to other structures of debt amortization.210 Obviously, fixed-rate mortgages
dominate the market in Russia, as it was in the US until the 1970s-1980s.211 I believe that
limiting AHML standards to fixed-rate mortgages at this point is counterproductive as it restricts
product diversification. Moreover, individual negotiations with AHML as to every single nonfixed-rate MBS will be complicated, time-consuming, and, potentially, increasing the costs of an
issue and underlying mortgages.
The Agency, as an open joint-stock company, which is “independent of public authorities
in its decision-making except when it is provided for by federal laws,”212 albeit owned by the
federal government, makes every effort to avoid excessive risks. In doing so, it acts in the way
fundamentally different from the methods of GNMA, FNMA and FHLMC. For instance, all
207
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mortgages sold by regional operators, lenders or servicing agents to AHML are accompanied by
option agreements to sell the mortgages back to an originator.213 Moreover, being aware of the
peculiarities of Russian public law, the Agency requests local authorities enact regional statutes
on subsidizing mortgagors through the so-called “Special-Purpose Long-Term Programs.”214
The May 2007 transaction was the second Ruble transaction215 and revealed significant
structural and product developments. It was the first tranched MBS issue, including three classes
(A, B and C) of MBS. Tranching in this case served a two-fold purpose of appealing to investors
with diverse risk preferences and providing an internal credit enhancement. The other credit
enhancements used were also internal and structural, namely, those were an excess spread and a
special reserve account. That model was cardinally different from the first abortive securitization
attempts in 2003, when the Agency solely relied on a government guarantee. From the point of
view of the US market, the transaction was straightforward and might be classified as passthrough with pari passu and pro rata distribution of cash flow among security holders within
separate tranches.
In the US, similar types of pass-through MBS – where an investor owns an undivided
interest in the collateral mortgages, which are predominantly fixed-rate fully amortized
mortgages, and receives a pro rata share of cash flow – is still the main primary product of
FNMA. Yet, there are more than half a dozen of MBS structures backed by various types of
mortgage loans and offering numerous hybrid structures and multiple derivative products, some
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of which are issued through REMICs and grantor trust templates. Only to some extent, do the
AHML experiments seem to be modeled after the FNMA prototype.216
One of the distinctions between the US GSE system and the Russian one is the new
element including the participation of regional “market operators” as intermediaries verifying the
validity and correctness of mortgage documents and performing the primary pooling functions.
This component is not mandatory, as banks may perform the same task in certain cases, and is
justified by the geographical dispersion of mortgages and the lack of AHML resources necessary
to perform the primary screening on the spot.
AHML, contrary to the US GSEs, does not usually guaranty payments of either principal
or interest on MBS. Mostly structural credit enhancements are currently employed along with the
application of the AHML eligibility criteria to all mortgage collateral217. In order to provide asset
fencing and eschew potential commingling of assets, SPVs in the May 2007 issue have a two-tier
structure. Two Dutch SPVs are the sole shareholders of the First Mortgage Agent of AHML,
which is registered in Russia and under the laws of the RF.218 Such two-tier SPVs are commonly
unnecessary for GSEs in the US. They generally rely on well-known securitization vehicles, such
as REMICs, for achieving bankruptcy remoteness and for tax purposes. In Russia, however, the
bankruptcy law is not yet clear enough with regard to potential bankruptcy of an SPV or an
originator.219 Neither is there any entity similar to REMICs. Instead, the tax status of Russian
SPVs has not been laid out yet, while the legal form that they must use at registration is a “joint-
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stock company.”220 Some of these hurdles cannot be directly eliminated by AHML per se and
may require extensive lobbying efforts by AHML and the market.221
The Russian financial system is comparatively stable today, but substantially
underdeveloped compared to the first world countries, what implies the need for further reforms
in law and regulations. Quantitative and qualitative characteristics of the Russian financing
illustrate that it is very much behind many developed countries.222 Statistics reveal that shortterm financing still prevails in banking practices223 and that lending operations and issuing
securities do not exceed 7% in the structure of investments in the RF.224 That is hardly
surprising, because most large companies, mostly in oil and gas businesses, address international
financial markets, while local lending operations, consumer financing and mortgage programs of
national and regional banks are relatively trivial.
A potential market stimulus – competition – was precluded by high market concentration
of banking capital in Moscow225 and uneven distribution of financial resources. In fact, Russia is
currently moving to a sort of financial market oligopoly.226 More than 80% of bank assets and
70% of capital are controlled by Moscow banks, while 90% of GDP are produced in other
regions. A few largest Moscow banks have expanded their national networks immediately
seizing the leadership positions in the periphery. Those several market leaders determine what
220
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bank products are offered in most regions.227 Excessive market concentration is always a
problem per se. In Russia, it is also coupled with the absence of the dual-banking system, which
might have provided some regulatory and other benefits to local banks. Currently, the largest
banks in the regions exhibit weak hypothecal and consumer lending, while the secondary market
for residential mortgages is sluggish and undersized.228
Many economists believe that it is urgent for Russian banks to develop new products,
expand the current market boundaries through financial innovations, including entering into
structured finance transactions and ABS,229 which are commonly tested through mortgage
products and MBS methodologies.230 Imperfections and discrepancies in the statutory
foundations of mortgage securitization restrain the development of primary and secondary
markets for mortgages and MBS, what calls for deliberate government policies and more crossjurisdictional transplanting. Some steps have been already taken in this direction. However, the
new law and regulatory requirements are far from being perfect and, what is more, suffer from
excessive administrative rigidity, what is very characteristic to Russia and much less so to the
US.
The Statute on Hypothecal Securities, for instance, enforces the positions of banks by
specifying that MBS may be issued only by the authorized entities,231 including banks,232 and
submits all corresponding regulations to the authority of the Central Bank as the single federal
bank regulator.233 Under the statute, the Bank of Russia is responsible for determining the ratio
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of the mortgage pools to the total MBS issued and to bank capital, liquidity and risk ratios, and
other factors that it may find requisite for MBS issues.234 The corresponding Guidelines235 of the
Central Bank set forth the requirements for MBS issued by banks supplementing the standards of
Russian securities laws.
The Guidelines also mention some structural aspects of bank MBS, including credit
enhancements that banks may use for MBS issues. Those include surety agreements,236 bank and
state guarantees,237 as well as internal credit enhancements, such as tranching, and the general
principles of how the tranches need to be issued and redeemed. For instance, simultaneous
placement of different tranches of one issue is prohibited.238 All tranches must be disposed of
within one year after the registration date.239 The Guidelines define the liability of banks in case
of unsatisfactory performance or default on their obligations under an indenture, the distribution
of profits in case of foreclosure of real estate collateral,240 and many other minute structural
points. The Guidelines even outline what should be understood as a material breach of contract in that case, of an indenture - defined as a delay in payment of the next structural coupon within
seven days or a delay in discharging the obligations to pay principal within 30 days or a refusal
to make the foregoing payments.241
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Interpreting the Statute on Securities Markets,242 the Central Bank specified additional
requirements for a prospectus and a registration statement for MBS.243 The Guidelines also
provide for a closed-end list of grounds justifying the rejection of registration of an MBS issue.
In addition to bank capital requirements and provisions of the Federal Statute on Hypothecal
Securities (MBS), the Central Bank requires MBS offer a certain coupon, which should be paid
at least annually.244 Hence, it is unclear whether, for instance, MBS issuers are permitted to sell
zero-coupon securities at discount. Considering the general regulatory spirit of the Guidelines,
the answer is, probably, “no”, unless the issuers are not banking and financial institutions falling
within the regulatory authority of the Central Bank.
The Future of the Russian Securitization: Lessons from the US
Despite all the pros and cons of the Russian present regulatory framework and potential
overregulation, at the very least, it is certain that policy-makers and financial regulators finally
acknowledged that MBS are among the pressing needs of the banking market.245 Nonetheless,
this understanding has not yet assured perceptible securitization developments, which should
have brought together regulators and private financial institutions. Considering the experience of
the US, securitization may seem to be a long-term process. However, the major changes in the
US occurred not so long ago, and it was in the past twenty years, when private market entities
started working in close cooperation supported by the judiciary and the regulators. The resulting
benefits in the form of lower mortgage rates, affordability of credit capital, standardization of
mortgage instruments necessary for their marketability are unequivocally financial and legal
242
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achievements that cannot be obscured by the happenstance of the present subprime crisis.
Developing economies can and should adopt some of the US practices, while attempting to
circumvent the undesirable consequences of imprudent market behavior.
Consumer protection is one of such issues. For some countries with strong regulatory
authorities, including Russia, the general tendency is to over-regulate market. In Russia, such
overregulation is purported to not only protect consumers, but also to prevent market fraud and
maintain a firm supervisory grip over the financial industry. However, both supervisory and nonregulatory responses incentivize market discipline and may benefit consumers. The new SEC
oversight of rating agencies is one example. New amendments to the existing federal programs,
such as, e.g., FHASecure, which offer acceptable work-outs for lenders and mortgagors without
any statutory changes, and the reconsideration of TILA and similar disclosure mechanisms are
another. In fact, in order to preserve and develop MBS as a financial instrument and avoid
potential credit crunches, a government can and should effectively address the two concurrent
dilemmas of consumer-mortgagor protection and purely market matters avoiding excessive
regulatory intervention.

How efficiently Russian AHML and law-makers will build up a

combination of Russian TILA, high-cost loan legislation and support [or oversee] the free market
initiatives, including numerous types of MBS and derivatives, as well as monitor the credit rating
methodologies remains to be seen.

Conclusions
The echo of the subprime problems and the ensuing liquidity crisis will be heard
throughout the economy for some foreseeable time in the future. As the rating agencies persist in
scrutinizing MBS markets, downgrading of funds dealing in MBS and debt securities tied to
61

suprime mortgages will continue.246 For many firms, the write-downs of now low-grade assets
will ostensibly have long-term consequences and capital markets investors will react
accordingly.247 Even the invincible quasi-state giants FNMA and FHLMC, who attempted to
decrease their exposure to subprime risks ex ante, are also in predicament experiencing liquidity
crunch.
For instance, Fannie Mae’s Annual Report asserts that they “chose to stand back from the
frenzy [of subprime markets] and avoid competing for mortgage assets and securitization
business [they] thought too risky or unprofitable.”248 Yet, last year FNMA announced that in
order to continue conservative practices in the current risky environment it needed more liquidity
through issuing new stock and cutting dividends249 with plunging stock prices on the
background. Freddie Mac is in a similar situation. Its 2006 Annual Report announced that “in
order to protect consumers and raise underwriting standards, Freddie Mac took the lead in
announcing that after September 1, [it would] not buy subprime mortgages that pose an
unacceptable risk of excessive payment shock and possible foreclosure.”250 However, the risks
were, obviously, not hedged to the necessary extent as was evidenced by, e.g., the $2.03 billion
losses in the third quarter of 2007 and Freddie’s proposals to sell shares.251 The analysts and the
GSEs themselves believe that the losses are short-term and that they will not disturb the segment
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of providing guarantees.252 That is quite possible as Freddie and Fannie Mae were operating in
the least risky segments of the mortgage market. Moreover, the government has recently
loosened the capital requirements for both GSEs.253
This paper has argued that the Russian FNMA transplant - AHML – should continue
looking at its prototype and expand its practices in terms of providing guarantees, lobbying for
the first-tier insurance and diversifying the types of mortgages it works with. The current US
mortgage meltdown is not representative of the MBS as a whole. For more than 30 years, the
process worked well until the old disclosure regime ceased to adequately assess the financial
instruments of grown complexity. Even sophisticated investment banks, like Bear Stearns or
Merrill Lynch, and financial holding companies, such as Citigroup, underestimated the risks of
the novel structured financial instruments. The Russian market is, by no means, at the stage of
affairs where complexity trumps market sophistication and creates a breeding environment for
predatory lending and fraud. In fact, as a developing economy, Russia may and, probably, need
to adopt the adequate standards of disclosure and consumer protection instead of placing
structural limitations on mortgage originators and MBS issuers.
The current model that AHML is implementing appears to be a truncated version of the
GSE MBS with some alterations. There are several inadvertent repercussions of this state of
affairs. The first one is that it tends to ignore the risk of corruption and political risks.254 Those
are important at several junctions. At the federal level, the hazard stems from bargaining for ad
hoc guarantees for every single issue of MBS with federal authorities. At the regional level, the
potential for corruption derives from the state ownership of regional operators and the local
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Special Purpose Programs. Due to this regional political risk and given that the economic
development of Russian regions is precariously uneven,255 it may be more prudent to use federal
and state resources simultaneously and to provide a blanket first- and second-tier insurance for
mortgages and MBS conforming to certain criteria.
Secondly, the very absence of the first-tier government guarantee or insurance analogous
to FHA hits, in the first place, the middle class mortgagors. Moreover, in case of a potential
financial crisis, the state may be impotent, as there will be no established platform, like
FHASecure or similar programs, to assist borrowers in refinancing their loans and avoid
foreclosure, what also benefits the lenders. As a robust secondary market for mortgages and
MBS is yet to be formed, the lenders may be left with no choice but to foreclose on the
mortgages.
Thirdly, the Agency has to acknowledge that their MBS structures are more analogous to
the GSE issues in the 1980s and early 1990s, than the present MBS programs in the US, and that
there is a significant potential for more development. It is crucial for the Russian GSE-AHML to
expediently pass through the primary MBS stage. The establishment of cooperation with the US
GSEs, the federal and state bank regulators and the SEC will be beneficial for achieving this
goal, despite any political impediments and repercussions.

The need for the structural

diversification of AHML’s products following the lead of the US GSEs, which are historically
responsive to changing investor preferences,256 is one of the reasons for such cooperation.
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Instead of rejecting the US MBS experience, Russian policy makers could draw valuable
lessons from the present US credit crunch. In any case, MBS is generally acknowledged as the
key to resolving many problems of housing markets, particularly, the one concerning availability
of housing finance inasmuch as “without securitization one cannot say that financing of longterm loans is sufficient [because] the growth of the demand for mortgages will [necessarily] go
along with the need for securitization.”257
In order to forestall potential mass defaults on high-cost subprime loans, as the US
witnesses nowadays, several preventive measures have to be introduced. The first one is a
properly adapted replica of TILA providing for private and public right of action for violations of
mortgage disclosure standards. Secondly, as mentioned above, placing limitations as to
disclosure and particular terms of high-cost home loans are also necessary. As Russian law is a
hierarchical system258 and everything under the heading of “civil law” is within the authority of
the federal legislature, only concerted actions of the federal authorities, including the legislative
branch and the Central Bank, may bring into being these statutory limits and provide for the
effective oversight of banks. Finally, the SEC’s initiative to verify rating methodologies
employed by the national raters is another element that Russian securities regulators259 should
look at. Since the Russian regulators has much less expertise of working with rating agencies,
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certifications by the SEC are a powerful signal of the high quality of rating that can be taken into
consideration in devising Russian regulatory policies. Regulatory and legal transplanting is,
obviously, not always the best option for other jurisdictions, because many legal and cultural
domestic factors may distort the model.260 Nevertheless, it is the inevitable option for most
developing markets as there are not so many cardinally different alternative ideas in finance and
banking.
There are several caveats to that, however. US serves as a model jurisdiction for
securities regulations and is recognized as the most market-oriented economy. Hence,
transplanting its supervisory mechanisms may pose serious challenges to other jurisdictions that
do not have “robust private enforcement of law.”261 As Prof. Coffee noted, the “panoply of
reforms adopted in the United States, culminating in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, may not
be the appropriate remedy in Europe.”262 The same may be true with respect to the SEC
enforcement regime and disclosure requirements. Yet, the US rating agencies dominate
international markets, many structured finance transactions are international and involve the US
financial institutions. The US will remain the core market and a statutory and regulatory model
for many other countries. Therefore, the US response to the crisis may have significant influence
on other jurisdictions.
It is obvious that more structural changes in market supervision and self-regulatory
methods are needed in the long run. The evidence that the crisis contagion spreads beyond the
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US263 may indicate that the problems are structural and not merely jurisdiction-based. The
subprime crisis cannot be attributed to a particular regulatory system per se, but to the market
asymmetries. Again, it will be the experience of the US that many jurisdictions will be looking
at. Currently, the reforms seem to oscillate between the two extremes of the support of free
market and the Wall Street and the intensification of government regulations.
One of the first market responses to the crisis was a proposal by Citigroup Inc., J.P.
Morgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America Corp. to establish the so-called Master-Liquidity
Enhancement Conduit in the amount of approximately $100 billion. The main underpinnings of
the proposed Super-SIV were issuing short-term notes used to buy at discount the highly rated
securities of SIVs.264 The idea of the Super-SIV was supported by the Department of Treasury265
and at least not opposed to by the Fed.266 However, that market initiatives waned with the speed
proportionate to the growth of bank losses in the forth quarter of 2007 and in 2008. Instead of
the market self-help, federal and state regulators expand their oversight, the Fed assists in taking
over imprudent investment banks, FHA extends its insurance programs, while state regulators
work out their own solutions, such as Home Equity Theft Prevention Act in NY and others.
Theoretically, the liquidation of asymmetries in the wake of the crisis could vest the SEC
and other regulators with unnecessary excessive powers that might reduce market efficiency in
the future. In real life, disclosure and increasing transparency will, most probably, become the
motto of the upcoming reforms. One of the main lessons of the subprime mortgage failure is that
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MBS-related disclosure and consumer protection mechanisms must be reviewed by the
regulators on the regular basis, sometimes, in response to the concerns expressed by consumer
advocates, and not only in the aftermath of another financial or social emergency.
In any case, the current problems are, clearly, relatively short-term. With further
corrections of market inefficiencies, the modified MBS will, possibly, remain a viable instrument
supporting mortgage markets and capital availability proving that “[c]apitalism [is] by nature a
form or method of economic change and not only never is but never can be stationary.”267
Correcting the existing financial instruments will always be a continuous process. Yet, after this
credit crunch, the mortgage markets will return to utilizing more CDOs and MBS, albeit after a
more cautious risk assessment, better pricing and less exposure to predatory mortgage
origination.
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